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MATHILDE COHEN*
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Deliberations: Two Models of
Judicial Deliberations in Courts of Last Resortt
This Article discusses supreme and constitutional courts' internal
organizational cultures, that is, the way in which justices organize
their work and establish informal decision-making norms. Courts of
last resort are often presented as exemplary deliberative institutions.
The conference meeting, which convenes judges in quiet seclusion to
debate, has been glorified as the most significant step in a court's deci-
sion-making process. Based in part on qualitative empirical research,
I argue, however, that French, American, and European justices may
not deliberate in the full sense that deliberative democrats have
theorized.
The Article distinguishes two types of high court deliberations,
which I call the "ex ante" and the "ex post" models. In the first model,
prevalent in the French and European courts, judges draft and delib-
erate the court's merits opinion before the case is orally argued and
scheduled for the conference meeting. In other words, cases are de-
cided before being decided. The second model is typical of Anglo-
American supreme courts, in particular the United States Supreme
Court; in this model, justices do most of the deliberative work after the
case has been orally argued and a vote on the merits has taken place
at the conference. In other words, cases are decided after being
decided.
Despite different judicial cultures, one common theme is that in
both ex ante and ex post courts, judges tend to decide cases through a
succession of multiple small group interactions involving non-judicial
personnel rather than a single prolonged face-to-face deliberation. The
upshot of the Article is the formulation of a dual-influence hypothesis:
a court's style of judicial opinions may form deliberations as much as
deliberations shape opinions.
* Associate Professor of Law and Robert D. Glass Scholar, University of Con-
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INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses supreme and constitutional courts' inter-
nal organizational cultures, by which I mean the way in which judges
organize their work and establish informal decision-making norms.'
Contrary to current orthodoxy in legal and political science scholar-
ship, I argue that these courts may not be exemplary deliberative
institutions. 2 In Political Liberalism, John Rawls described courts,
especially high courts, as paragons of democratic deliberation. He fa-
mously declared that "in a constitutional regime with judicial review,
public reason is the reason of its supreme court."3 The authority of
courts is supposed, according to deliberative theorists, to rest in large
part on the qualities of judicial deliberations-the exchange of rea-
sons and arguments that takes place both behind closed doors, in the
conference room, and in the public forum, through the publication of
opinions linking a court's decisions to sources of legal or moral au-
thority.4 Based in part on exploratory qualitative empirical research,
this Article argues that in practice French, American, and Europeanjustices5 may not deliberate in the full sense of "deliberation" that
1. Symbolic management, or the management of organizational culture, has
been described as a mechanism that directs behavior through shared values, norms,
and goals. See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
(1949).
2. I use the expressions "courts of last resort" and "high courts" interchangeably
to designate both supreme and constitutional courts, whether domestic or regional.
While the U.S. Supreme Court is the highest court of appeals for constitutional as
well as other issues, the other courts covered in this Article are more specialized. In
France, there is a sharp distinction between the two supreme courts (the Conseil
d'Etat, the highest court of appeals for public law, and the Cour de cassation, the
highest court of appeals for private law) on the one hand, and on the other hand, the
specialized constitutional court (the Conseil constitutionnel, which is the only court
empowered to engage in (constitutional) judicial review of legislation and executive
actions). The European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union are supranational regional courts, but they have arguably become akin to
international constitutional courts. Although neither European court is technically a
constitutional court, they both engage in extensive constitutional review based on
written instruments, respectively the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and the European Treaties, in order to decide whether a state is in
violation of these international instruments. In addition, the Court of Justice of the
European Union is the highest court in the European Union for matters of EU law.
The Article occasionally refers to the U.K. Supreme Court, which is more limited in
its powers ofjudicial review than the U.S. Supreme Court given that it is theoretically
unable to review the constitutionality of legislation. See U.K. Supreme Court, Prac-
tice Direction 10, http://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/practice-direction.10.html.
3. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231 (1993).
4. See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Courts as Delib-
erative Institutions: Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice, in
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 22(Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002) (describing constitutional courts as deliberative institu-
tions whose legitimacy depends on persuasive reason-giving).
5. Throughout the Article, I use the words "judges" and "justices" interchangea-
bly to refer to the judicial personnel of courts of last resort.
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deliberative democrats such as John Rawls or Joshua Cohen have
theorized. 6
What is deliberation, according to deliberative theory, and why is
it desirable? Deliberative theorists often oppose two modes of deci-
sion-making: voting versus deliberation. Voting proceeds by
aggregating individual preferences. It does not require that voters de-
bate among themselves or attempt to justify their preferences to one
another. Voting mechanisms produce a consensus on questions of
common concern, but they leave individual opinions unchanged. In
contrast, deliberation is an exercise in mutual justification. During a
deliberation, participants must present and justify their respective
judgments so as to reach agreement on a common decision. The dis-
cussion must in principle take place face-to-face, with all participants
present and enjoying equal opportunities to express their views.7 The
superiority of deliberation is supposed to derive from the fact that it
produces decisions which are the outcome of an actual convergence of
individual judgments.
My research suggests, however, that courts of last resort do not
consistently follow this pattern. Despite very different internal orga-
nizational cultures in place in Anglo-American and continental
European courts, I have been struck by one commonality. In both ju-
dicial cultures, there is little face-to-face deliberation involving the
entire court, and it is often not the case that all participants have
equal opportunities to influence decisions. The two cultures diverge,
however, as to the timing of deliberation. At the French and the Eu-
ropean high courts,8 judges frequently decide cases in advance of the
established forum for deliberation, i.e., the conference meeting. At
the U.S. Supreme Court, justices characteristically decide cases after
the conference meeting. Although there are variations in the work
methods of the courts I studied, and within each court, from panel to
panel and from judge to judge, two broad trends have emerged. This
Article thus identifies two ideal types of high court decision-making,
6. See RAWLS, supra note 3. See also Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic
Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 67-92 (James Bohman & William Rehg
eds., 1997). But see Maya Sen, Courting Deliberation: An Essay on Deliberative De-
mocracy in the American Judicial System, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
303 (2013) (critiquing the deliberative depiction of the U.S. Supreme Court through
the use of political science models, which have shown that judges are strategic and
use zero-sum, quid pro quo bargaining).
7. Face-to face meetings are those in which participants communicate by talk-
ing, listening, and observing nonverbal behavior, and in which there is no lag between
the sending and receiving of communication signals.
8. Neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the Court of Justice of the
European Union technically count as "Continental" courts, since they include common
law countries and have been, to some extent, modeled and influenced by both civil law
and common law principles and procedures. However, part of my argument rests on
the claim that, by and large, the Continental judicial model-and in larticular the
French model-has prevailed in terms of the internal organizational culture at the
two European courts.
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which I call the "ex ante" and the "ex post" models.9 Neither model is
all or nothing, as most courts can be characterized as falling along a
continuum between the two poles. But each model has its paradig-
matic cases.
In the ex ante model, prevalent at the French and European
courts, judges engage in what I refer to as "pre-deliberations." Typi-
cally, a court member called the "reporting judge" (juge rapporteur in
French) is assigned the management of a case. The reporting judge's
main task is to propose a disposition and draft an opinion before the
oral argument and conference meeting take place. As a result, the
conference focuses not so much on how the court, as a collective en-
tity, should decide the case, but rather on whether or not other panel
members will sign off on an already fully written opinion, which has
previously been circulated and discussed. In other words, cases are
decided before being decided.
The ex post model is typical of the United States Supreme Court.
In that model, justices engage in what I call "post-deliberations."
They do most of the decision-making work after the oral argument
and conference meeting have taken place. In principle, for each case,
all deciding justices receive briefs and have the opportunity to read
and analyze them before the conference is convened. The conference
discussion, however, is usually skeletal. A real debate will not be at-
tempted for most cases. The purpose of the conference is typically
twofold: to quickly determine which outcome the majority favors and
to assign the task of writing an opinion to one or several justices. It is
to the opinion writers that conference participants allocate the au-
thority and competence to instigate a conversation among the other
justices and thereby shape the court's reasoning. In other words,
cases are decided after being decided.
The Article does not take a normative stance on the two models
proposed. My aim is neither to deplore the fact that courts of last
resort fail to exhibit all of the deliberative traits praised by delibera-
tive democrats nor to propose an alternative decision-making
scheme. Rather, my primary goal is to provide an in-depth descrip-
tion of the way in which a few courts decide cases and to map out a
typology of internal organizational judicial cultures.10 Different
courts have elaborated different ways of dealing with disagreement
among justices. These approaches may not always be truly "delibera-
tive," but, as we will see, they seem to work inasmuch as they
9. I use the Weberian concept of ideal type as a constructed model employed to
approximate reality by selecting and accentuating certain traits. See Max Weber, Ob-
jectivity in Social Science and Social Policy, reprinted in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949).
10. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973) (on
the idea of an interpretive theory of culture which can be channeled through "thick"
descriptions).
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facilitate the settling of controversial cases while allowing judges to
express their viewpoints.
The upshot of the Article is the formulation of a dual-influence
hypothesis. I hypothesize that a legal culture's style of judicial opin-
ions forms court deliberations as much as deliberations shape
opinions. If judges must by law issue a single, unsigned collegiate
judgment and are prohibited or discouraged from writing separate
opinions, we can expect to observe consequences in their court's inter-
nal organization. For instance, they will probably need to deliberate
in advance of the conference meeting to ensure that a majority will
support the court's draft opinion on conference day. But if, as in the
Unites States, each justice is individually responsible for her expla-
nations, there might be an inclination to deliberate after the
conference meeting up until a compromise opinion (or series of opin-
ions) has been agreed upon.
A few words on methods are in order. I describe my methodology
as "qualitative comparative legal research," by which I mean that I
use qualitative data collection-interviews, field observation, immer-
sion in secondary sources, and archival research-to generate
theories and hypotheses about the way in which judges and other
court personnel make law in different legal cultures.11 Qualitative
methods allow for the inclusion of actors' cultural understandings of
institutions through the recounting of their interactions and social
experience within the court. 12 The limitation of this methodology,
though, is that I cannot treat the small number of judges and court
personnel I interviewed and observed as the full population of high
court decision-makers. 13 But the advantage is that the decisive role
11. The exploratory research for this Article was conducted between the spring of
2010 and the spring of 2012 under the auspices of a grant from the Mission de
recherche Droit et Justice, the research arm of the French Ministry of Justice. Political
scientist Pasquale Pasquino (New York University) and I carried out an empirical and
comparative research project, focusing mainly on six courts: the three French courts
of last resort (the Cour de cassation, Conseil d'Etat, and Conseil constitutionnel), the
two European high courts (the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of
Justice of the European Union), and the U.S. Supreme Court. For more details on the
methodology and the data, see our final report: MATHILDE COHEN & PASQUALE PAS-
QUINO, LA MOTIVATION DES D9CISIONS DE JUSTICE, ENTRE 9PISTI MOLOGIE SOCIALE ET
THtORIE DU DROIT: LE CAS DES COURS SOUVERAINES ET DES COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES
[JUDICIAL REASON GIVING, BETWEEN SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND LEGAL THEORY: THE
CASE OF COURTS OF LAST RESORT AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS] 13-15 (2013).
12. See MICHtLE LAMONT & PATRICIA WHITE, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION,
[REPORT OF THE] WORKSHOP ON INTERDISCIPLINARY STANDARDS FOR SYSTEMATIC QUALI-
TATIVE RESEARCH 10 (2005), available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/ISSQR~work
shop.rpt.pdf (discussing the strength of qualitative research in exploring micro-social
phenomena and actors' cultural understandings.)
13. Beginning with a few contacts at the courts under study, I recruited most of
my interviewees through the contacts of previous interview subjects (a practice
known as "snowball sampling"). This recruitment method is necessary in the hard-to-
access world of high courts, but is subject to a number of biases. See Patrick Biernacki
20141
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of individuals in sustaining and transforming judicial cultures is
made more apparent.
The data essentially consist of a series of semi-directive inter-
views with current or former judges and law clerks, as well as field
notes taken to memorialize participant observations at various court
meetings I attended between 2010 and 2012.14 The bulk of the data
has been gathered in three jurisdictions: France, the Council of Eu-
rope/European Union, and the United States. I have studied the
three French high courts (the Conseil constitutionnel, the Cour de
cassation, and the Conseil d'Etat, with a particular emphasis on the
latter), the two European courts of last resort (the European Court of
Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union), and
the Unites States Supreme Court. Even though I have not included it
in my case studies, throughout the Article, I occasionally refer to the
U.K. Supreme Court as a reference point for a quintessential common
law judicial culture.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the theory of
deliberative democracy and its focus on high courts. I then turn to
descriptions of the internal organization in place at the courts stud-
ied for this project. Part II delineates the ex ante model, typical of
French and European high courts, while Part III focuses on the ex
post model, exemplified by the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, Part IV
argues that deliberation at courts of last resort may be different from
democratic deliberation, and that it takes place similarly, in many
important ways, in ex ante and ex post courts.
I. ARE COURTS DELIBERATIVE INSTITUTIONS?
A. The Theory of Deliberation
What is deliberative democracy? Deliberation in its ordinary
meaning is the process by which people engage in the careful weigh-
ing of options and consequences to decide what to do. 15 But what
precisely deliberation means and entails for deliberative theorists is
a matter of enduring controversy. Deliberative democracy commonly
& Dan Waldorf, Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral
Sampling, 10 Soc. METHODS & RES. 141 (1981).
14. Our study involved seventeen in-depth, semi-structured interviews with cur-
rent or former judges and law clerks and several days of participant observation at
the Conseil d'Etat and the European Court of Human Rights. This is not in any sense
a representative sample but simply a reflection of individual judges and court person-
nel whom we considered particularly interesting for this study and who made
themselves available for interview. I supplemented this first round of interviews by
conducting additional interviews during the summer of 2014 with ten more subjects
(judges, staff attorneys, law clerks, and translators) at the French and European
courts of last resort. The identity of the interviewees has been kept confidential. They
are referred to in this Article using random letters.
15. See ARISTOTLE, NiCOMACHEAN ETHics 1112a30, 1112b11-16, 1139b6,
1140a32.
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refers to the idea that legitimate law is the result of the public delib-
eration of citizens. Two central themes recur in the literature. The
first centers on deliberation as a democratic decision-making proce-
dure. The second pertains to deliberation as a way of relating to one
another in a democratic polity.
First, according to deliberative democrats, deliberation is supe-
rior to aggregative decision-making procedures such as the voting
process that is traditionally associated with democracy. Voting pro-
ceeds from the aggregation of individual preferences concerning
individual interests, leaving those preferences unchanged. Voters are
sovereign; they do not need to explain or justify their choice to others
or to listen to their arguments. As a result, there is no requirement
that voters endorse the collectively adopted resolution or judgment as
their own. By contrast, according to deliberative theorists, the pro-
cess of arguing can transform people's views and produce new ones.
16
A successful deliberation leads to an actual convergence of individual
judgments.17 Deliberation relies on people's capacity to be swayed by
rational arguments. Deliberators are exposed to new information and
alternate perspectives. In the process, they hope to convince other
participants of their own views, but are also prepared to take other
people's judgments as grounds for revising their own.
Second, deliberation reflects a specific way of relating to others,
which lends legitimacy to collective decisions. Deliberation embodies
mutual respect as it requires that participants enjoy equal opportuni-
ties to influence collective decisions. According to deliberative
democrats, collective decisions are legitimate if they can be the ob-
jects of a reasoned agreement among free and equal citizens.' 8 The
deliberative ideal is based on a principle of equal participation and
equal power. In order to treat each member of a deliberating group as
an equal moral member, each must be afforded a part in collective
decisions and each must have an opportunity to influence those deci-
sions. In this vision, deliberation is understood as a process of mutual
16. See Gerry Mackie, Does Democratic Deliberation Change Minds? 5 Pol. Phil. &
Econ. 279 (2006) (arguing that the effects of persuasion are real albeit often latent,
indirect, delayed, or disguised).
17. See, e.g., the evidence cited in Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (U.
Chicago L & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 164; U Chicago, Public Law Research
Paper No. 34, 2002).
18. See Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in CONTEMPO-
RARY POLITICAL PHILosoPHY: AN ANTHOLOGY 143, 162 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip
Pettit eds., 2006):
In ideal deliberation parties are both formally and substantively equal. They
are formally equal in that the rules regulating the procedure do not single
out individuals. Everyone with the deliberative capacities has equal standing
at each stage of the deliberative process. Each can put issues on the agenda,
propose solutions, and offer reasons in support of or in criticism of proposals.
2014]
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justification: law and policies are legitimate to the extent that they
are publicly justified to the members of the community.
Deliberative theorists acknowledge that the design of institu-
tions can influence the potential for deliberation. Certain
institutional norms are cited as fostering deliberation, such as the
face-to-face gathering of individuals, insulated from the usual pres-
sures of social interactions such as hierarchical relationships, the
need to please one's constituency, or the need to make decisions
under strict time constraints. While the real world of political dis-
course often falls short of the deliberative ideal, institutions such as
high courts have been praised for approximating that ideal.
B. Courts as Model Deliberators
A number of scholars have claimed that high courts are model
deliberative institutions. 19 The argument is that in contrast with
other branches of government, which rely on majoritarian politics,
courts are responsive to moral reasoning. 20 Not only do they use de-
liberation as a decision-making method, but they also publicly justify
their decisions to citizens via published opinions. This presentation
might come as a surprise given that courts have long been accused of
anti-democratic tendencies. According to Alexander Bickel's famous
charge, when a court strikes down a legislative act or executive action
as unconstitutional, it acts in a countermajoritarian and therefore
antidemocratic way.21 How have courts of last resort been trans-
formed from a democratic anomaly into models of democratic
decision-making? According to deliberative theorists, high courts' rel-
ative insulation from electoral politics may be precisely what leads
them to being exemplary deliberative institutions.22 Lacking legiti-
19. See Rawls, supra note 3, at 231-40 (claiming that supreme courts are the ex-
emplar of public reason). See also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 69-71
(1985) (depicting courts as "the forum of principle"); Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note
4, at 22-27 (summarizing the various deliberative expectations of the different insti-
tutions of democracy); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT (2001) (focusing on the link between judges' lack of accountability at the
ballot box and their deliberative nature, and arguing that courts are the ideal setting
for principled moral argument about public issues); FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN
AND DEMOCRACY 57 (2005) (writing that "[t]he judiciary, we may think, has some in-
stitutional advantages over other branches of government when it comes to deciding
philosophical questions"). But see CHRISTOPHER F. ZURN, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2007) (criticizing the claim that judicial
opinions use the language of principled moral and political argument as an idealiza-
tion); Sen, supra note 6.
20. Contra Rawls, supra note 3, at 240 (arguing that "while the Court is special in
this respect, the other branches of government can certainly, if they would but do so,
be forums of principle along with it in debating constitutional questions").
21. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1986).
22. U.S. Supreme Court Justices are appointed for life. While the judges at the
other courts in question are not appointed for life, they serve relatively long terms.
Judges at the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de cassation are career judges who have
[Vol. 62
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macy at the ballot box, judges' authority must rely on another form of
legitimacy, which consists in persuading the public that their deci-
sions are the result of reasoned deliberations. Moreover, deliberative
theorists claim that certain features of high courts' internal organiza-
tion bestow on them special capacities for deliberation: an egalitarian
culture, group decision-making, and reason-giving.
1. Egalitarian Culture
A basic feature of the deliberative democratic ideal is the princi-
ple of political equality, which means that each party to a
deliberation should have an equal opportunity both to participate and
to be heard.23 Asymmetries in power and resources undermine demo-
cratic deliberations, the argument goes, because citizens adapt their
preferences to their station in society, altering their choices based on
what they believe their options are rather than on the intrinsic quali-
ties of those options.24 While strict equality in terms of socioeconomic
status, knowledge, or cognitive abilities is neither always achievable
nor required for a successful deliberation, equality of influence is. 25
An elite should not dominate discussions. The decision should result
from the deliberation of all participants, all of whom have adequate
opportunities to speak, or at least equality of opportunity for different
views (rather than individual persons) because of the importance
that a diversity of perspectives be heard.
The egalitarian culture of high courts seems to meet this crite-
rion. Judicial independence means that judges do not operate within
a chain of command; they do not report to a supervisor. In principle,
all judges have the opportunity to participate in the decision-making
on equal footing. Each casts one and only one vote. Each is able to
advance arguments that others might find persuasive. Moreover,
judges often seem to come from similar educational and professional
backgrounds, making it presumably easier for them to achieve dis-
passed a merit examination after graduate school. They typically spend most of their
career at the same court, progressing by seniority (as in the Conseil d'Etat), or they
are elevated from one court to the next until they reach the court of last resort (as in
the Cour de cassation). Conseil constitutionnel members are selected either by the
President of the Republic or the Presidents of the two houses of Parliament, and serve
for one non-renewable nine-year term. As for the European Court of Human Rights
and the Court of Justice of the European Union, each member state nominates a
judge, whose appointment must be ratified by all the other member states, after con-
sultation by a special committee for the Court of Justice of the European Union.
European Court of Human Rights judges are appointed for a non-renewable nine-year
term, and Court of Justice judges for a renewable six-year term.
23. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 74ff. (1989).
24. JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109ff.
(1983).
25. Jack Knight & James Johnson, What Sort of Political Equality Does Delibera-
tive Democracy Require?, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 279, 280
(arguing that democratic deliberation requires equal opportunity of access to political
influence).
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cursive equality.26 In the United States, the use of the expression
"brethren" to describe justices sums up this aspiration to an egalita-
rian culture.
2. Face-to-Face Group Discussions
Another key assumption in deliberative theory is that parties to
a deliberation not only have adequate speaking opportunities, but
that they also engage in face-to-face debate with other participants.
This means that deliberations should happen at a specific time, typi-
cally over a period lasting anywhere from one hour to a few days, and
in a specific location where the group can physically meet. For each
participant to have adequate opportunities to express her views and
listen to others, deliberations should take place in small groups, com-
prising three participants or more. Many benefits are said to flow
from group discussions in which individuals can see and hear one an-
other, the most important being that each person is exposed to
countervailing views and reasons.
Courts of last resort seem to satisfy the face-to-face group discus-
sion criteria given that their typical review requires the collective
judgment of more than one judge to avoid (or at least minimize) error
by failing to correct a trial or appellate judge.2 7 Whether they adjudi-
cate cases en banc or sit in panels, high court judges have generally
adopted a form of conference system. 28 At some point in the decision-
making process, judges convene face-to-face to discuss the resolution
of a case. Conferences take place within a more or less flexible time
frame, typically lasting a few hours or, very rarely, a few days, and in
a specific place-most courts include a conference room specifically
dedicated to that end. 29 Conferencing enables judges to collectively
exchange ideas on the issues involved and, where applicable, to vote
on the disposition.
26. See the op-ed by U.K. Supreme Court Justice Lady Hale, Equality in the Judi-
ciary, THE LAWYER (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.thelawyer.comlequality-in-the-judicia
ry/3001768.article.
27. Certain courts, however, use judges sitting alone to screen cases or decide rou-
tine cases on the merits. At the European Court of Human Rights, for example, since
2010 judges sitting alone have been able to review the admissibility of applications
and reject those that are plainly inadmissible. A similar procedure has been in place
at the Conseil d'Etat since the 1990s. See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
28. With a few exceptions, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Conseil constitution-
nel hear all of their cases en banc. The European Court of Human Rights, the Court of
Justice of the European Union, the Cour de cassation, and the Conseil d'Etat sit in
panels of varying size depending on the importance and novelty of the case. The deci-
sion whether to retain a case before the full court or a large panel usually turns on
whether the case is likely to break new ground. The more complex the case, the more
judges are involved.
29. On the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court conducts its conferences, see
THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONs BEHIND
NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONs 3-126 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
[Vol. 62
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3. Reason-Giving
Deliberative democrats claim that reason giving is an essential
activity of the democratic state.30 They are often committed to a jus-
tificatory conception of democracy requiring that decisions made by
the three arms of government be either acceptable or capable of being
made acceptable to every individual.31 Because under conditions of
freedom, people disagree about values, the argument goes, public offi-
cials ought to justify the state's action on the basis of reasons that all
citizens may reasonably accept or at least understand.32 More specifi-
cally, deliberative democrats insist that judges owe a special duty to
justify their decisions. 33 And among judges, high court judges' reason
giving is deemed to be fundamental to the political and moral legiti-
macy of a democracy. Two prominent representatives of this view are
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, who respectively depicted the
United States Supreme Court as an "exemplar of public reason"34
and a "forum of principle. '35
30. The centrality of deliberation to the legitimacy of democratic institutions has
been explored by AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOC.
RACY? 23 (2004) (who note that "[wI]hen binding decisions are routinely made without
deliberation, the government not only conveys disrespect for citizens, but also exposes
its lack of adequate justification for imposing the decision on them").
31. In last two decades, a number of philosophers have advanced a justificatory
conception of liberalism. See, e.g., GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN
ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1996) (critically examining liberal
political theories' reliance on various epistemologies of justification). See also Joshua
Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 6 (1986); Amy GUTMANN &
DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); HENRY S. RICHARDSON,
DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY (2003); Jer-
emy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 137 (1987).
32. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 215, 218 (1987) (arguing not only that public justification has the practical
value of ensuring political stability, but also that the possibility of justifying the sys-
tem to as many participants as possible is of independent moral importance); Stephen
Macedo, The Politics of Justification, 18 POL. THEORY 280 (1990) (arguing that com-
mitments to reason-giving and reason-demanding inform some of our most valuable
political practices).
33. There are a few exceptions to this judge-centric approach to democratic legiti-
macy. Philip Pettit, for example, focuses on legislators. See PHILIP PETTIT,
REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997). See also Earl M.
Malz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HoUs. L. REV. 1395 (2000) (ques-
tioning the theory that the public cares about the process of legal decision-making);
Jeremy Waldron, The Core Case Against Judicial Review 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1382
(2006) (pointing out that legislators give reasons for their votes just as judges do: the
reasons are given in what we call legislative debates and they are published in the
Congressional Record; the difference is that lawyers are trained to study and analyze
the reasons judges give, not legislative reasoning.).
34. See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 231. See also John Rawls, The Idea of Public Rea-
son, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 93, 108 (asserting that "in a
constitutional regime, public reason is the reason of its supreme court").
35. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981)
(depicting judicial review as democracy's backdrop for principled discourse). See also
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239ff (1986) (developing the thought experiment of
the superjudge Hercules, "a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience, and acu-
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Justices are presented as model decision-makers because they
have a moral obligation-and in some jurisdictions a legal obliga-
tion 36-to provide reasons for their decisions. Supreme and
constitutional courts' most obvious work products are judicial opin-
ions-explaining and justifying decisions to litigants, other
institutional actors, and the public. These opinions can be seen as the
external counterpart of the internal deliberations which take place
behind closed doors, arguably providing critical accountability and le-
gitimacy to high courts.37 Opinions connect judicial decisions to prior
democratic acts embodied in treaties, constitutions, or statutes, thus
functioning as proxies for democratic legitimacy. Having to argue in
public as well as in private, the argument goes, encourages judges to
examine their own beliefs and arguments: they are expected to state
their position carefully, state openly the principles they rely on, and
defend them against actual and possible counterarguments. The idea
is that when courts publicly articulate their reasoning, citizens will
have a content-independent basis for obeying the law.
In sum, deliberations, both internal and external, are seen as key
to courts' legitimacy. While certain theorists take the thesis that
courts are deliberative institutions as an illustration of what they
mean by the concept of deliberative democracy, others make claims
men" who is able to articulate the most coherent and principled justifications for
decisions).
36. The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to explain its decisions and issue written
opinions, but it is not legally required to do so. See Sup. CT. R. 41 ("Opinions of the
Court will be released by the Clerk immediately upon their announcement from the
bench, or as the Court otherwise directs."). See also Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of
Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 146 (1999) (pointing out
that "the Supreme Court has no legal obligation to issue opinions"). Where the re-
quirement is legally imposed, it may either be specific to a given court or generally
applicable to all courts within a jurisdiction. The European high courts exemplify the
first approach. See Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaty Establishing the European Communities, and Certain Related Acts art. 36,
Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1 (subjecting the CJEU to a statutory duty to give
reasons expressed in the following terms: "Judgments shall state the reasons on
which they are based. They shall contain the names of the Judges who took part in
the deliberations."). See also the European Convention on Human Rights, formally
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
45, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("Reasons shall be given for judg-
ments . . ."). France illustrates the second approach: there is a general, statutory
mandate for all courts-private law courts, criminal courts, and administrative
courts-to write opinions accompanying their decisions. See NOUVEAU CODE DE PRO-
CPDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] ART. 455; CODE DE PROC9DURE P2NALE [C. PR. PP-N.] arts. 485,
593, CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.] art. 9; Conseil d'etat [C.E.], Aug. 2, 1924, Dame
Paquin, Rec. p. 782 (pointing out that the reason-giving requirement is a "general
procedural rule which must be followed by all courts even absent a written statute"
["r~gle gdndrale de procddure s'imposant mime sans texte e toutes les juridictions]).
37. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Les-
sons from Europe, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1697 (2004) (contrasting courts' "internal" and
"external" deliberations).
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about institutional design.38 This Article primarily responds to the
latter, as I am mainly interested in the way in which real-world
courts structure their decision processes. In the next two Parts, I pro-
pose two models of high court decision-making. The models draw
analytic distinctions between ideal types rather than mutually exclu-
sive archetypes, keeping in mind that actual courts contain a mixture
of both.
II. Ex ANTE COURTS
This Part describes the internal organization of what I refer to as
"ex ante courts." My primary case study comprises the French high
courts-the Cour de cassation, the Conseil constitutionnel, and the
Conseil d'Etat-as well as the two European supranational courts of
last resort: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).39 I distinguish three
phases in the decision-making process of ex ante courts: the individ-
ual phase of the reporting judge, the small group phase of the pre-
conference deliberations, and the collective phase of the conference
meeting.
A. The Pre-conference Phase
1. The Reporting Judge
Ex ante courts rely on a division of labor predicated upon the
central task of a so-called reporting judge. The question of whether a
court uses reporting judges is key to understanding that court's inter-
nal organization. It determines to a great extent whether or not the
court's deliberation will occur prior to, during, or after the conference.
The reporting judge is the judge to whom a case is initially as-
signed before argument, conference, and decision. She stands as a
buffer between the parties and the court, supervising the review of
the record below as well as filtering the evidence where applicable.
Depending on the court, cases are distributed to reporting judges in
38. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 4 at 22-27 (summarizing the vari-
ous deliberative expectations of the different institutions of democracy).
39. A number of United States courts seem to fit the ex ante model-be it at the
appellate level for federal courts, or at the appellate and supreme court level for state
courts-in that they pre-assign the drafting of merits opinions to judges before cases
are orally argued and discussed in conference meetings. See Daniel J. Bussel, Opin-
ions First-Argument Afterwards, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1194 (2014) (describing the
California Supreme Court's current decision-making mode as following what I would
describe as an ex ante pattern). See also John B. Molinari, The Decisionmaking Con-
ference of the California Court of Appeal, 57 CAL. L. REV. 606 (1969) (in which the
author, a California justice, describes the conference system at the California Court of
Appeal); George Rose Smith, The Appellate Decisional Conference, 28 ARK. L. REV.
425 (1975) (surveying the various conference systems in place at the state supreme
courts).
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rotation by the court's president, 40 the panel's presiding judge,4" or a
court administrator.42 At the ECtHR and the Conseil constitutionnel,
a rotational system is designed to ensure an impartial method of as-
signing cases: all judges take turns as reporting judges regardless of
seniority or expertise. At other courts, the institution of the reportingjudge may correspond to a division of labor based on experience or
competency. At the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de cassation, particu-
lar judges (usually the most junior, apprentice-like judges) are
assigned the reporting judge's task, while others (usually the most
senior) are exempted from the task. 43 Still another system is for re-
porting judges to be chosen based on their specific area of expertise,
as is the case at the CJEU.
Asked to define the reporting judge's office, a Conseil d'Etat
judge responded that:
the real job for the reporting judge, I think, is to present his
position, so he writes for himself first, to explain his position
and why he's proposing a given draft opinion. . . . At the
same time, a good reporting judge must show what the other
plausible solutions are, even if only to dismiss them. He
opens and closes doors. He's not supposed to present his po-
sition only, but to explain why in the end he retains that
position.44
The reporting judge's main duty is to prepare two types of internal
documents before the case is argued: a memorandum 45 and a draft
opinion. 46 The memorandum usually takes the form of an objective
40. This is the case at the Conseil constitutionnel and the CJEU. On the Conseil
constitutionnel's practice, which developed under Ldon Noel's tenure as court presi-
dent, see Jodl Boudant, Le president du Conseil constitutionnel, 103 REVUE DU DROIT
PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'9TRANGER [JouRNAL OF FRENCH
AND FOREIGN PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE] 589 (1987). At the CJEU, this is
codified in the RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 197, 2012 O.J. (L265) 1, 40. See also David Edward, How the Court of Justice Works, 20 Eur. L. Rev.539, 549 (1995) (describing the allocation of cases to reporting judges).
41. This is the standard procedure at the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de
cassation.
42. This is the case at the ECtHR where case distribution is in the hands of the
registrar.
43. There is an important exception to this division of labor according to seniority.
When mid-level or senior judges return to their judgeship after having been assigned
for a number of years to another public service post outside the court (or after having
taken a leave of absence to pursue a career in the private sector), they usually serve
as reporting judges upon their return to the court. In that scenario, the reportingjudge could have very substantial experience both inside and outside the court.44. Interview by Pasquale Pasquino with Judge G., mattre des requites at the
Conseil d'Etat (June 9, 2010) (my translation).
45. That memo is called a rapport at the Cour de cassation and the Conseil consti-
tutionnel, note at the Conseil d'Etat and the ECtHR, and rapport pr~alable at the
CJEU.
46. Depending on the court, the draft opinion might be called aprojet dejugement(ECtHR), projet dlarrt (Conseil d'ePtat and Cour de cassation), projet de motif (CJEU),
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essay discussing the facts and procedural history of the case, analyz-
ing the applicable law, responding to the arguments raised in the
briefs, and weighing the pros and cons of affirming or reversing. The
draft opinion is oriented to the views of the reporting judge but is
written impersonally, following the court's stylistic rules. To save
time in case other judges do not concur in her recommendation, the
reporting judge may prepare more than one draft, each premised on
different legal grounds and leading to a different disposition. As a
junior judge of the Cour de cassation explained, in potentially divisive
cases, "one must show a sufficient flair to have prepared two drafts
.... even if initially you only had one, you were going for a reversal,
and it becomes, for example, an affirmance, in that case you must
have prepared in advance. '47 Once completed, the memo and draft
opinion(s) are circulated to the other panel members via e-mail or
through an internal electronic docket.
As will be explained below, following the English tradition, the
U.S. Supreme Court remains attached to the idea that all deciding
justices should inform themselves on equal terms about the cases, at
least initially.48 This stands in stark contrast with ex ante courts,
where each case's records and briefs go to the reporting judge only. 49
Is the reporting judge system a function of a court's workload? The
U.S. Supreme Court and the U.K. Supreme Court decide a relatively
small number of cases yearly. 50 Conversely, at courts such as the
ECtHR, the CJEU, the Conseil d'Etat, and the Cour de cassation, due
to ever-increasing caseloads, the reporting judge system is crucial for
courts to dispose of cases in a timely manner. It permits the continua-
tion of the collective decision-making that is characteristic of high
court adjudication, but without duplicating judicial effort, given that
each judge does not have the time to study the briefs and the record
in every case. 51
Caseload management in and of itself, however, cannot be the
main reason for using reporting judges, considering that the function
developed at a time when cases were sparse and has endured to this
day in courts handling a small caseload, such as the Conseil constitu-
tionnel. In France, the reporting judge's role has been formalized
or projet de ddcision (Conseil constitutionnel). At the Cour de cassation, the reporting
judge is expected to produce a third document, the so-called avis, which is a subjective
memo expressing her personal opinion on the case.
47. Interview with Judge Q, conseiller rdfdrendaire at the Cour de cassation (May
16, 2012) (my translation).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 109-110.
49. But some English and U.S. courts of appeals use a form of internal organiza-
tion similar to the reporting judge's function. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION
WRITING (2d ed. 2009). Certain state supreme courts in the United States also seem to
rely on a division of labor similar to the ex ante model. See, e.g., Bussel, supra note 39.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 187-193.
51. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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since the end of the thirteenth century at least. At the time, reporting
judges were known as inspectores or visores inquestarum ("those who
inspect or look at the inquiries") at the chambre des enqudtes, a cham-
ber of the Paris Parlement which functioned as a court of last
resort.52 Up until 1336, when they became full members of the court,
reporting judges were well-read young men hired for the sole purpose
of preparing cases for the judges. Because they did not work at the
court, they received a bag containing the briefs, the evidence, and
other records to take home. Their task was to produce what was
called an "extract" (extrait) of the case as well as an opinion
(judicium). The extract was a memo summarizing the parties' argu-
ments as well as describing and analyzing the evidence. Judges used
it to refresh their memories during their deliberations. 53 The opinion
explained which party had proven its facts best.54
The similarities between the medieval and the contemporary re-
porting judge are striking. The only significant difference is that
historically, the reporting judge focused on sorting out and assessing
the evidence, while present-day reporting judges mostly deal with
questions of law. Then and now, the institution signals a bifurcated
decision process, which proceeds first through an individualistic
stage monopolized by one judge-the reporting judge-and later
through a collective stage involving other panel members. The pre-
vailing practice according to which the reporting judge prepares the
opinion of the court before the conference, without full discussion
with all his associates, has been presented as encouraging one-judge
decisions and one-judge opinions.55 The reporting judge's agenda-set-
ting power is perhaps her most significant prerogative. It gives her
the opportunity to present her analysis in the best light so as to win
over her colleagues. In what follows, I examine whether the system
does in fact produce a one-judge decision or whether it is the informed
decision of a majority of the judges who participated in the case.
2. Small Group Discussions
The reporting judge's ascendency has been overestimated, I
think, given that the pre-conference stage is punctuated by numerous
interactions with colleagues and various forms of "small group" com-
munications which constitute pre-deliberations. I use the sociological
52. See PAUL GUILHIERMoz, ENQUtTES ET PROC2S, 140, 159-61 (Paris, Alphonse
Picard 1892). In the seventeenth century, the function was adopted by the Conseil du
roi, the King's Council, which also acted as a court of last resort. See Xavier Godin, La
procddure de cassation au XVIIIe sicle, 29 HISTOIRE, ECONOMIE & SOCI9T9 29 (2010).
53. See GUILHIERMOZ, supra note 52, at 141.
54. See id. at 148.
55. See NINA-LOuISA AROLD, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HuMAN RIGHTS 75 (2007) (noting, in the course of an ethnographic survey of the
ECtHR, that "[o]nly the majority's view appears in rulings-which from my personal
experience most often is the opinion of the judge rapporteur who prepared the draft").
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and psychological concept of small group as a set of individuals
united by a common task and between which direct and continuous
relationships are established.56 Members of a small group interact
based on their shared need to solve one or more problems. In courts
where judges write their opinions from scratch, such as the Cour de
cassation and the Conseil d'Etat, these small groups are by and large
composed of judges only. In courts where judges have become editors
rather than writers, the relevant small groups include non-judicial
personnel such as law clerks, staff attorneys, and other support per-
sonnel, including translators at multilingual courts such as the
European courts of last resort.
Despite the conventional picture according to which a court's col-
lective deliberation is confined to the conference meeting, a form of
small group pre-deliberation begins soon after the reporting judge
has received the case file. These pre-deliberations are sometimes the
result of serendipitous encounters in the court's corridors or common
spaces, but more often than not they are fostered or even orches-
trated by the court's internal organization. To illustrate, I pause to
describe in further details the functioning of the Conseil d'Etat and
the ECtHR.
a. The Conseil d'Etat
At the Conseil d'Etat, when a panel's presiding judge assigns a
case to a reporting judge, she also designates another judge as the
"check judge" (or "reviser," to follow the French "rdviseur") for that
case. Both judges are expected to commit their energies to the case,
the reviser being in charge of "quality control." As a judge pointed
out:
[w]ith the reviser, specifically, the idea is that collegiality is
important, but collegiality is more enlightened if we have
quality control at every stage. The reviser is here first to ver-
ify that the reporting judge did not make any mistake
because [the reporting judge] can err, ignore a case, forget a
line of precedents, misunderstand precedents. So there is
this aspect of quality control, of inspection after the facts if
you like. But there is also another aspect: he too [the reviser]
must contribute to the debate. He must put to the test the
... reporting judge's solution... [The reviser] might bring to
the table his own solution, which can differ from the report-
56. Eloise C. Snyder, The Supreme Court as a Small Group, 36 SOcLAL FORCES
232 (1958); Walter F. Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1565 (1966);
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JuDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell
eds., 2010).
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ing judge's. That's when it becomes interesting and why in
the end collegiality becomes a form of exchange.5 7
The system of the check judge dates back, at least, to the 1336
Paris Parlement's Style de la chambre des enqu~tes, an internal oper-
ating procedure manual aimed at judges, which recommended that
the reporting judge meet with a more experienced member of the
court to discuss his work before submitting it to the chambre des en-
quotes, the panel of the court that was in charge of supervising the
gathering of evidence.58 It was also the practice, for important cases,
to appoint a second reporting judge, who came to be known as "the
evangelist" (Wvanggliste). When the reporting judge was called to pre-
sent his work at the chambre des enqu~tes, the evangelist, acting as a
sort of check judge, would second him and substantiate his argu-
ments by reading excerpts from the depositions and other pieces of
evidence.5 9 The use of the Christian expression "evangelist" to desig-
nate the check judge is particularly interesting given that during the
same time frame, the Papal procedure for the canonization of saints
became formalized as a full-blown legal trial. 60 The new canonization
procedure was meant to block the proliferation of heretic saints by
scrutinizing applicants more strictly through an open debate. Aspir-
ing saints began to be represented by a new curial official, the
prosecutor of the cause, and the Pope, the "Promoter of the Faith,"
who eventually became more popularly known as "the Devil's Advo-
cate."61 Common to the French and Papal procedures was the idea
that under the guise of quality control, judges should be obliged to
enter into a debate with one another. Discord and contestation were
not to be avoided, but encouraged for the purpose of producing better
decisions. To that end, certain judges were summoned to review and
critique other judges' work.
To this day, this internal culture of disagreement persists at the
Conseil d'Etat, despite an external image of consensus perpetuated
by unanimous opinions. Once the reporting judge has completed her
memo and draft opinion, she submits them for review, usually elec-
tronically, to the reviser. The reviser is specifically expected to play
devil's advocate, looking for weaknesses, gaps, or limitations in the
reporting judge's planned solution. Using an editing software or
scribbling a few notes on hard copies before the first panel meeting,
57. Interview by Pasquale Pasquino with Judge G., supra note 44 (my
translation).
58. See GUILHIERMOZ, supra note 52, at 148. See also STYLE DE LA CHAMBRE DES
ENQU2TES para 122 (1336), reprinted in GUILHIERMOZ, supra note 52, at 181.
59. See GUILHIERMOZ, supra note 52, at 149.
60. See KENNETH L. WOODWARD, MAKING SAINTS: How THE CATHOLIC CHURCH DE-
TERMINES WHO BECOMES A SAINT, WHO DOESN'T, AND WHY 68 (1990) (recounting that
the new procedure was introduced under the Avignon popes (1309-1377)).
61. Id. at 68.
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the reviser may propose modifications, both minor and major. If a
discord emerges between the reporting judge and the reviser, the two
may meet face-to-face to discuss. Because of space constraints, the
Conseil d'Etat, which has been housed since 1875 in the Palais-Royal,
uses open-plan office spaces. Only the most senior judges who also
have administrative responsibilities receive a private office. All other
judges are lumped together in large rooms, making it easy for report-
ing judges to chat informally about their cases with their reviser or
other colleagues. As a senior conseiller d'Etat commented, "we spend
our lives together at the Conseil d'Etat."62 The reporting judge is free
to reject the reviser's edits and stick to her initial drafts, but this is
unlikely. Much like at the medieval Parlement, reporting judges are
akin to apprentice-judges: they are usually the most junior or least
experienced judges on the panel, having recently joined the court,
while revisers are chosen from among the most senior and seasoned
court members. 63 It would thus be awkward for a reporting judge to
systematically stick to her position in the face of a major disagree-
ment with her revisers.
The function of the reviser does not exist per se at the other ex
ante courts I studied for this project. But other forms of "devil advo-
cacy" transpire under the guise of procedures designed to ensure that
the reporting judge's work meets with her colleagues' pre-approval.6 4
b. The ECtHR
At the ECtHR, judges check the bureaucracy and are in turn
checked by the bureaucracy. There are some 270 staff lawyers at the
court's registry in charge of processing and preparing applications for
adjudication. Registry lawyers, not judges, study case files and draft
memos and proposed opinions. The reporting judge acts as a first-line
supervisor, overseeing the registry's memo and draft. A registry law-
yer described the pre-conference process in the following terms:
The reporting judge signs off [on the memo and draft] if he
agrees. If he disagrees, he polishes [the memo and draft ],
etc., and it continues [i.e., the documents go back and forth
between the lawyers and the judge]. Once [the reporting
62. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with Judge Y., conseiller
d'Etat at the Conseil d'Etat (Feb. 21, 2010) (my translation).
63. But see supra note 43.
64. For instance, at the Cour de cassation, the reviser's function is allotted to the
conference, which is composed of each panel's president and most senior member. The
two meet in person, without the reporting judges, to review and edit their memos,
draft opinions, and avis. They share their feedback with the reporting judges and the
rest of the panel electronically. Interview with Judge A., conseiller rdfdrendaire at the
Cour de cassation since 2008 (May 16, 2012).
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judge] agrees, [the case] is put on the panel's agenda, and
submitted to all other judges. 65
This back-and-forth typically takes place via memos or electronic
communications. For particularly important cases, the junior lawyers
assigned to the case, as well as more senior lawyers such as legal
division heads or section registrars, meet face-to-face with the report-
ing judge. 66 Like at the Conseil d'Etat, there is a form of engineered
culture of disagreement and debate, including between judges and
non-judicial personnel. According to one of the court's most senior
registry lawyers, "[i]f the lawyer defends a very strong position that
is in conflict with the judge's position, often [there's a debate]. Yes
absolutely, some judges are very open to this and it's very lively, so
it's normal."67
In addition, there exists an extra layer of "quality control" repre-
sented by the "jurisconsult" of the court and his team. These are a
group of registry lawyers in charge of monitoring the case law and
preventing case-law conflicts. 68 I like to think of the jurisconsult as
the ECtHR's "Grand Inquisitor." The jurisconsult and his delegates
receive and review all draft opinions. They can intervene at any time
in the writing of any opinion. During their weekly meetings, one of
the lawyers may declare, "Hey, I'm reading something that fails to
support 'the party line,' as we used to say during the Soviet time, that
is, contrary to orthodoxy."69 If the departure is substantial, in addi-
tion to talking to the lawyer and the reporting judge responsible for
the case, the jurisconsult uses a naming and shaming technique. He
includes in his weekly e-mail to all court members (including judges
as well as registry members) a cautionary note on the case. If this
admonition fails to elicit the desired changes, the jurisconsult can use
even more drastic means, such as withdrawing the case from the
panel and reassigning it to a different panel. Despite the avowed goal
of preserving the coherence of the court's case law, in practice, thejurisconsult's monitoring represents a supplementary forum for de-
bate and disagreement. Thus a member of the jurisconsult's team
pointed out that "my role ... too is to say, with my team, 'Beware, if
you depart from precedent, you must explain why.' One may very
well have good reasons, but it must be done transparently, and really
65. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with D., staff lawyer at theECtHR since 1996 (June 14, 2011) (my translation).
66. The ECtHR is divided into five sections, all of which have their own senior
lawyers, who are known as the head registrar and the deputy registrar.
67. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with D., supra note 65 (my
translation).
68. The Court created the office of jurisconsult in 2001. Since 2005, the "Case-
Law Conflict Prevention Group," a special committee composed of the President of the
Court and each section's president, has met to ensure consistency in the case-law.
69. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with C., staff lawyer at theECtHR since 1978 (June 14, 2011) (my translation).
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good reasons must be given."70 Seen from this perspective, the sys-
tem is a way of furthering pre-deliberations, especially on contentious
cases. The jurisconsult's weekly e-mails not only encourage the re-
porting judge and the registry lawyer to resume their deliberations
but they also open up the discussion for the full court to chime in.
3. The Advocate General
For complex or sensitive cases, the CJEU and the Cour de cassa-
tion have adopted yet another form of small group pre-deliberation
with the involvement of an "Advocate General" (AG).7 ' The Conseil
d'Etat uses a similar post, known as the rapporteur public.7 2 At these
three courts, the mission of the AG is to take a second look at cases as
an impartial and independent panel member. The AG is supposed to
act as a neutral third party who reviews the case from the beginning
and delivers an advisory opinion. One way of describing this function
in Anglo-American terms would be to compare the AG to an arnicus
curiae. AGs are full members of their respective courts, but they are
required to argue on behalf of public welfare and the proper applica-
tion of the law. Historically, they originated in the French ministre
public, a body that represented the King before the courts in the old
regime.
AGs introduce an extra layer of debate at the pre-conference
stage. They neither vote nor partake in the court's conference meet-
ing; or, if they are allowed into the conference room, as occurs at the
Conseil d'Etat, they are to remain silent. But they arguably play a
very important role in the court's pre-deliberations. A Conseil d'Etat
judge who formerly occupied the function of rapporteur public de-
scribed the behavior of the latter during a panel's preliminary
meetings as follows:
[T]he [rapporteur public] listens to the reporting judge, to
the reviser, to the collegial debate. If he has a few ideas in
mind, he can start provoking discussion, saying "OK, but I'm
confused, I'm asking myself what we should do in this case,
etc." He can even participate in the collegial debate. How-
70. Id.
71. The Advocate General originated in the French judicial system and is still in
use at the Cour de cassation. The function has been exported to other Continental
jurisdictions, as well as the CJEU. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUS-
TICE, arts. 16, 82, 2012 O.J. (L 265) 1, 12, 22. See Anthony A. Dashwood, The Advocate
General in the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 2 Legal Stud. 202
(1982); NOREEN BURROWS & ROSA GREAVES, THE ADVOCATE GENERAL AND EC LAW
(2007); Michal Bobek, A Fourth in the Court: Why Are There Advocates-General in the
Court of Justice?, 14 CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 529
(2011-2012).
72. The rapporteur public was formerly known as the commissaire du gouverne-
ment. For the purposes of the present discussion, I will include the Conseil d'Etat's
rapporteur public under the general designation of "Advocate General."
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ever, he can't vote. He never votes, he doesn't even have the
right to vote. But even at this stage, he can already ask
questions. 73
At the Conseil d'Etat, toward the end of oral arguments, after parties
have presented their case, the rapporteur public delivers an indepen-
dent opinion, known as "conclusions." The conclusions identify and
analyze the case law and the secondary literature, discuss the choice
of options available to the court from a policy perspective, and argue
for a given disposition. They could be analogized, depending on the
view endorsed by the rapporteur public, to concurring or dissenting
opinions. 74 According to the same Conseil d'Etat judge,
[t]he rapporteur public will need to express his position and
verify at the same time, somewhat similarly to the reviser,
but from a different vantage point, since he will ... conduct
a third level of quality control [the first and second levels
being the quality control accomplished by the reviser and
that resulting from the preliminary panel meeting]. We are
really talking, you know, about a chain of quality control. At
the same time he starts debating, putting the solution into
perspective, testing it, deciding whether he agrees or dis-
agrees, drafting his conclusions. If he disagrees . . . he can
get back to the panel, or send an e-mail, or engage in an in-
formal discussion to say, "I disagree with such and such
argument" and attempt to win over the panel. Or we all re-
hash and reach another solution.75
The chronology is different at the CJEU, given that the reporting
judge usually begins drafting his opinion after the AG has delivered
her conclusions orally or circulated them in writing in cases where no
hearing has been scheduled. 76 As a former law clerk recounted,
"before getting started on the opinion [of the reporting judge], we gen-
erally wait for the Advocate General's conclusions." 77 The reportingjudge still sets the tone for the debate. Prior to starting work on the
73. Interview by Pasquale Pasquino with Judge G., supra note 44 (my
translation).
74. When there is a conflict between the court's opinion and the AG's conclusions,
the conclusions sometimes influence the evolution of the case law, with counsel in
future case citing them as persuasive authority, much like influential dissents in the
common law tradition.
75. Interview by Pasquale Pasquino with Judge G., supra note 44 (my
translation).
76. Also, unlike the sequence at the French courts, at the CJEU, when AGs de-
liver their opinions orally, they usually do so a few weeks after the hearing, at a
public sitting of the court. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE, art.
76, 2012 O.J. (L 265) 1, 12, 22.
77. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with former law clerk F. at
the CJEU from 2002 to 2008 (Dec. 15, 2011) (my translation).
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case, the AG has already heard the reporting judge summarize his
views during the full court's weekly meeting. The AG has also read
the reporting judge's preliminary report. But the fact that the report-
ing judge delays drafting his opinion until after the AG has had the
opportunity to present her conclusions signals that a conversation is
taking place. Some CJEU commentators claim that AG conclusions
have "a systematic positive influence on ECJ decisions."78 Without
going that far, I would point out that the back-and-forth between the
reporting judge and the AG functions as a form of pre-deliberation in
the sense that each attempts to persuade the other through the ex-
change of arguments and counterarguments. In that respect, AGs
illustrate the way in which ex ante courts have institutionalized the
mandatory consideration of alternative perspectives and points of
criticism well ahead of the conference meeting.
4. Preliminary Meetings
In certain courts, depending on the complexity of the case, one or
several panel meetings are scheduled before oral argument and con-
ference. 79 These are known as "section meetings" at the ECtHR,
"general meetings" at the CJEU,80 and "preliminary meetings" at the
Conseil d'Etat.8 They convene all panel members (or the full court)
face-to-face to discuss cases before they are scheduled for oral argu-
ment and decision on the merits. Most judges have not studied the
briefs and the records, but only briefly perused the reporting judge's
documents, which are circulated in advance of the meeting, to ascer-
tain that they are not fundamentally opposed to his plan. They
discover the case through the reporting judge's oral presentation,
sometimes accompanied by the reading of the draft opinion. The
meeting affords the panel the opportunity to reach a consensus before
the argument and the post-argument conference.
These preliminary meetings themselves are often preceded by
small group pre-deliberations. In case of potential disagreement, it is
considered courteous to let the reporting judge know before the meet-
ing, be it via e-mail, phone, or in person. As a junior judge at the Cour
de cassation noted, "it enables you to go see a colleague and tell him,
'There might be a problem' or 'I don't agree with you.' ' 8 2 Similarly, an
ECtHR judge explained:
78. Clifford J. Carrubba, Matthew Gabel & Charles Hankla, Judicial Behavior
Under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice, 102 Am.
POL. Sci. REV. 435, 449 (2008).
79. Typically the cases that make it to these preliminary meetings are the ones
that raise "important" or complex issues.
80. See Edward, supra note 40, at 552.
81. The term in French is stances d'instruction.
82. Interview with Judge A., supra note 64 (my translation).
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My system is that if I don't like what's proposed, I first talk
to the reporting judge to let him know that I'm not OK [with
the proposal], that perhaps we should think it through. Of
course it depends on who the reporting judge is, on our per-
sonal relationship. Another option is to write a memo and to
send it to colleagues well in advance, between four to five
days ahead of time, attempting to persuade them that an-
other approach would be preferable.8 3
Preserving the court's collegiality often requires that court members
actively engage in pre-deliberation. A former CJEU clerk suggested
that:
if out of the blue, without warning, a chamber... sends us
[i.e., the reporting judge and his clerks] a memo stating that
the draft opinion doesn't add up... and suggesting an alter-
native version, it's really hard because we neither had the
chance to inform the reporting judge that there was a prob-
lem nor to discuss and reason with the [disgruntled]
colleague.8 4
At the Conseil d'Etat, panels convene weekly preliminary meet-
ings to discuss non-routine cases. Each case can take anywhere from
a few minutes to a few hours, depending on its complexity and the
level of accord or discord among the judges. Typically, the reporting
judge opens the discussion, followed by the reviser and the rap-
porteur public. They basically re-enact the pre-deliberation that took
place in pairs for the benefit of their colleagues, with the idea that
weighing the pros and cons of each approach all over again will en-
sure that the panel does not bring premature closure to the
discussion by quickly agreeing to the first plausible solution they
hear. At one of the meetings I observed, I was struck by the presiding
judge's attention to the level of agreement in the room. She would
consistently conclude the discussion of each case by gauging the
group's readiness to find common ground:
-On this case, we are really divided...
-Here, I have the feeling that there is a quasi-consensus for
-For case X, we are more or less in agreement, right? Either
way, the reporting judge's two draft opinions are ready.85
83. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with Judge E., in post at the
ECtHR since 2002 (Jan. 7, 2011) (my translation).
84. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with former law clerk F.,
supra note 77 (my translation).
85. Author's ethnographic field notes (Feb. 11, 2011) (on file with author).
974 [Vol. 62
EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST DELIBERATIONS
The reporting-judge phase multiplies opportunities for judges to disa-
gree and critically review one another's work, with the successive
intervention of the reviser, the rapporteur public, and any other col-
league willing to pitch in. In comparison, preliminary meetings
endeavor to build consensus. This effort can turn into heated argu-
ments about one's voting intention, such that the meetings also serve
as venues for compromises and bargaining. At the Conseil d'Etat, I
noticed that the most senior judges did not hesitate to frankly ex-
press their reluctance to join an emerging majority unless the
reporting judge conceded to specific modifications of the draft opin-
ion. I witnessed a particularly telling exchange between a presiding
judge-who was struggling to end a sparring match between two of
the most well-respected judges on the panel-and one of those judges:
Presiding judge: "I propose that we go as is [to the oral argu-
ment and conference meeting], and we'll see."
Judge: "Wait, I will only join the draft opinion if we clearly
say [in the opinion] that the prefect must ensure compliance
with environmental regulations even when acting under the
Sports Code."86
In sum, before oral argument, judges thus have multiple opportuni-
ties, if not obligations, to confer about a case and engage in small
group pre-deliberations.
5. Oral Argument
Once an agreement has been reached on a draft opinion, the re-
porting judge finalizes the draft based on his colleagues' input. The
case is ready for oral argument and decision. In ex ante courts, oral
argument-if it takes place at all-plays a lesser role than in ex post
courts. In contrast to Anglo-American courts, which still grant an im-
portant role to hearings as a mode of advocacy,87 ex ante courts rely
on a mostly writing-centered legal process, reserving oral arguments
for the most important or complex cases and dispensing with them
for the bulk of their caseload. Significantly, until a 2008 constitu-
tional revision, the French Conseil constitutionnel did not hold
hearings at all; all cases were decided via written proceedings.8
8
86. Id.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 120-121.
88. Loi constitutionnelle 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institu-
tions de la Ve Rdpublique [Constitutional Law 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on the
Modernization of the Institutions of the 5th Republic], Journal Officiel de la Rpub-
lique frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 24, 2008, p. 11890; Ordonnance
58-1067 du 7 novembre 1958 portant loi organique sur le Conseil constitutionnel, art.
23-10, J.O., Nov. 9, 1958, p. 129 (as modified by the Loi organique 2009-1523 du 10
d~cembre 2009). This constitutional revision introduced a form of concrete review
(l'exception d'inconstitutionnalitg) into France, meaning that the Conseil constitution-
nel can now be petitioned by individual claimants to review the constitutionality of
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When no arguments are scheduled, the case goes straight to the next
conference's discussion list. When they take place, oral proceedings
are short, rarely lasting more than an hour. Hearings are highly sol-
emn events, which do not lead to any real dialogue between judges
and counsel.8 9 Judges rarely ask questions. They tend to listen in si-
lence to counsel, who merely read their submissions. 90 In courts
operating with Advocates Generals, perhaps the most significant mo-
ment of oral argument is the AG's reading of her conclusions. In sum,
ex ante judges do not engage in deliberations on the bench. More
often than not, oral arguments are ceremonial affairs which do not
play a critical role in the decision process.
B. The Conference
The conference, strictly speaking, is the moment when the judi-
cial body (be it the full court or a judicial panel) meets with all
members present to formally decide a matter. Few legal rules specify
the way in which the conference is supposed to operate. 91 This dearth
of law on the books conjoined with the fact that meetings are confi-
dential makes them hard to study. Except for the Conseil
constitutionnel, which publicly releases verbatim transcripts of its
conference meetings twenty-five years after they have taken place,
the conduct of conferences remains within the domain of specula-
tion.92 That said, through a variety of sources, it has become possible
to gain insight into what goes on behind closed doors both in ex ante
statutes after their enactment. Oral proceedings were introduced as a concession to
the necessary "modernization" of the legal system, allowing France to "catch up" with
its European neighbors.
89. An added burden for international courts such as the ECtHR and the CJEU is
the necessity for simultaneous interpretation, which interrupts and slows down the
debates, thus hampering spontaneous exchanges.
90. See, e.g., Ian S. Forrester, The Judicial Function in European Law and Plead-
ing in the European Courts, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 647, 714 (2007) (describing the CJEU's
oral arguments).
91. See, e.g., Guy Canivet, Comprendre le dglibdrg? Ou le "mystre de la chambre
du conseil", in MtLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE SERGE GUINCHARD; JUSTICES ET DROIT DU
PROCESS: DU LtGALISME PROCtDURAL A L'HUMANISME PROCESSUEL 205 (2010) (pointing
out the lack of legal framework governing the Cour de cassation's conference meet-
ings). Similarly, the Rules of the U.S. Supreme Court (Sup. CT. R. (2013)) omit any
mention of procedures for the conference. By contrast, the European courts' rules are
more forthcoming. The Rules of the ECtHR codify the conference's voting pattern. See
ECTHR RULES OF COURT (July 1, 2014), Rule 23, available at http://www.echr.coe.intl
Documents/RulesCourtENG.pdf ("The decisions of the Court shall be taken by a
majority of the judges present. In the event of a tie, a fresh vote shall be taken and, if
there is still a tie, the President shall have a casting vote."). The Rules of the CJEU
also purport to regulate the conference proceedings. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
COURT OF JUSTICE, arts. 32(3)-(4), 2012 O.J. (L 265) 1, 15 ("(3) Every Judge taking
part in the deliberations shall state his opinion and the reasons for it. (4) The conclu-
sions reached by the majority of the Judges after final discussion shall determine the
decision of the Court.").
92. A first selection has been published with great fracas in LES GRANDES DILIBtR-
ATIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 1958-1983 (Bertrand Mathieu et al. eds., 2009).
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and in ex post courts. Former court personnel with inside knowledge
such as clerks and staff attorneys have provided behind the scene
accounts.93 A few judges have shared some information in memoirs,
interviews, scholarly articles, public presentations, and through the
publication of their personal papers.9 4 Finally, a handful of academ-
ics have been allowed to observe conference meetings, most famously
anthropologist Bruno Latour when conducting research for his book
on the Conseil d'Etat.95
Confidentiality. In principle, conference meetings are protected
by secrecy. In practice, their degree of confidentiality is more a mat-
ter of organizational culture than black-letter law.96 The conference's
privacy varies from court to court. At the Cour de cassation and the
CJEU, no outsider may enter the room during conference, which is
strictly reserved for deciding judges. 97 Other courts are more open. At
the Conseil d'Etat, in addition to the deciding judges, a number of
individuals may be present: the rapporteur public, clerks, interns,
and members of the registrar for the purpose of note-taking. At the
ECtHR, the registry lawyers who worked on the case as well as trans-
lators and interpreters may join the conference meeting.98 At the
Conseil consitutionnel, the secrdtaire gdndral (head registrar) attends
93. This is especially true of the U.S. Supreme Court. See e.g., BOB WOODWARD &
ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979); EDWARD LAZA-
RUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE Epic STRUGGLES
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998). Both books claim to take the reader into the
Court's behind the scene operations, relying in part on justices and law clerks as
sources. Lazarus is a former clerk to Justice Blackmun and touted his book as an
"eyewitness account."
94. In the United States, there is an established tradition of more or less re-
vealing memoirs or accounts by former Supreme Court justices, e.g., CHARLES EVANs
HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1928); SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR
& H. ALAN DAY, LAzY B: GROWING UP ON A CATrLE RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH-
WEST (2002). A similar trend seems to be emerging in France. See, e.g., DOMINIQUE
SCHNAPPER, UNE SOCIOLOGUE AU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (2010) (in which the au-
thor, a sociologist and former Conseil constitutionnel judge, recounts her experience at
the court).
95. BRUNO LATOUR, THE MAKING OF LAW: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE CONSEIL
D'ETAT (2010).
96. The procedural rules of the ECtHR and the CJEU require that new judges
and AGs appointed to the court take an oath which includes a secrecy component.
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 4, 2012 O.J. (L 265) 1, 10 ("I
swear that I will perform my duties impartially and conscientiously; I swear that I
will preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court."); see also id., art. 32(1), at
14.ECTHR RULES OF COURT, supra note 91, Rule 3 ("I swear.., that I will exercise my
functions as a judge honourably, independently and impartially and that I will keep
secret all deliberations."); see also id., Rule 22(1).
97. The CJEU recognizes an exception for "assistant rapporteurs." These are spe-
cialists in a particular area who can be called to draft the court's judgment. They are
allowed to be present during the court's conference meeting dealing with the case they
helped resolve. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 32(2), 2012
O.J. (L 265) 1, 14.
98. See ECTHR RULES OF COURT, supra note 91, Rule 22(2).
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the conference, together with stenographers who take down a verba-
tim record of the exchanges. 99
Purpose. The purpose of the conference is very different in ex
ante and ex post courts. In ex post courts, as I argue in the next Part,
the aim of the conference is to reach a decision on the disposition of
the case and to assign the task of writing the majority opinion. Very
little attempt is made to discuss the reasoning. In ex ante courts, the
conference has a dual goal. Judges decide on both the outcome of the
case and the reasons supporting that outcome. The group approves
not just broadly stated arguments, but actual draft opinions, which
as we have seen, are circulated to all the deciding judges beforehand.
This fundamental difference explains why most of the deliberation in
ex ante courts takes place before the conference. The French tradi-
tion, adopted by the European courts, is for judges to leave the
conference room with finalized opinions ready to be sent to print. A
senior Conseil d'Etat judge summarized the custom by declaring that
"when we exit the conference room, the opinion has been ap-
proved."100 This sometimes requires that judges edit or even rewrite
opinions on the spot, as another Conseil d'Etat judge recounted:
During the conference meeting, there are several options.
We adopt the draft opinion as-is or, and that's the most fre-
quent scenario, we adopt it with modifications, or we don't
adopt it .... In most cases, in eighty percent of the cases I
would say, we enter modifications on the spot, minor ones,
though they can lead to adding one word here, one word
there... Sometimes this can have a repercussion on the sub-
stance, on the reasoning . . . We might say "Here, we
shouldn't have that argument, it's off topic." We do all this
on the spot. 101
Timing. The conference is usually set immediately or shortly af-
ter oral argument. It can last anywhere from a couple hours (the most
frequent scenario) to a few days (in exceptional cases).102 Conference
meetings are on the shorter side given that they have been preceded
99. The secrdtaire gdndral is more akin to a shadow Chief Justice than to a court
administrator, as she is involved in every court decision from the preliminary stages
until the final drafting. See GUILLAUME DRAGo, CONTENTIEUX CONSTITUTIONNEL FRAN-
QAis 180 (1998) (pointing out that the function of the secrdtaire general is much more
than the administrative function officially granted to it).
100. Interview with Judge I., conseiller d'Etat at the Conseil d'Etat (June 30, 2010)
(my translation).
101. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with Judge H., conseiller
d'Etat at the Conseil d'Etat (Feb. 21, 2011) (my translation).
102. At the Conseil constitutionnel, exceptionally, the conference can be broken
down into several sittings (e.g., n' 81-132 DC du 16 janvier 1982, Rec. p. 18 sur la loi
de nationalisation), or even days (e.g., n' 84-181 DC des 10 et 11 octobre 1984, Rec. p.
78; n 86-207 DC des 25 et 26 juin 1986; n' 86-208 DC des 1er et 2 juillet 1986, Rec. p.
78).
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by pre-deliberations in the form of small group discussions, strings of
e-mails, and exchanges of memoranda. By the time they sit at the
conference table, participants are well-informed about the facts and
the applicable law. They are prepared to adopt an opinion.
Three main reasons explain this need for pre-deliberations. First,
pre-deliberations are "face-saving practices" in Erving Goffman's
sense. 10 3 They help prevent the occurrence of the social embarrass-
ment that would result from a majority rejecting the reporting
judge's proposal. To avoid that situation, as a former CJEU clerk ex-
plained, "there is really a super important pre-conference effort ....
[I]t's shameful .. . if we're at the fourth or fifth draft and it still
doesn't work. It's really shameful. 1 0 4 No judge wants to lose face by
being disowned by his colleagues during the formal conference meet-
ing.1 05 The conversations and exchanges that compose the pre-
deliberations take place in pairs and trios where personal exchanges
may be easier and more readily allow for personal camaraderie and
understanding, as compared with the greater formality and interper-
sonal distance that larger groups often elicit. Second, pre-
deliberations serve as a case management strategy. It is more effi-
cient from the reporting judge's perspective to have secured a
majority before the conference. Should his proposal be rejected at the
conference, he would need to scrap his draft and start over again.
1 0 6
Writing a new opinion from scratch would represent an increase in
workload and delay the resolution of the case until the next confer-
ence meeting. Third, because of certain courts' institutional design, it
may be imperative for the judicial panel to deliver an opinion on the
day of the conference or very shortly thereafter. For instance, the
Conseil constitutionnel works on an extremely tight schedule. By law,
when reviewing statutes prior to their enactment (the so-called "a
priori review"), it has one month, starting from the day it receives a
petition, to issue an opinion. That time limit is extended to three
months when the court engages in U.S. style judicial review (the so-
called "a posteriori review" known as exception d'inconstitution-
103. ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS IN FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 13
(Transaction Publishers 2005) (1967).
104. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with former law clerk F.,
supra note 77 (my translation). F. used the French expression "c'est la honte," which
connotes a strong feeling of shame and guilt.
105. See GOFFMAN, supra note 103, at 9, 12 (articulating the concept of losing face
in professional, face-to-face settings and "face work," i.e., "the actions taken by a per-
son to make whatever he is doing consistent with face").
106. The Italian Constitutional Court has an ad hoc procedure to deal with this
type of situation that seems to be unheard of at the courts under review. Should the
reporting judge finds herself in the minority, the president of the Italian court can
reassign the opinion to a different judge. To reflect this split, the final opinion distin-
guishes between the giudice relatore (the reporting judge) and the giudice redattore
(the writing judge. See AUGUSTO CERRI, CORSO DI GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE 89 (5th
ed. 2008).
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nalitg).07 This means that the reporting judge and staff lawyers have
ten or twenty days at most to draft an opinion, all the while consult-
ing with other judges to secure a majority.108 It is thus key for the
reporting judge to persuade his colleagues to join his opinion before
the conference takes place.
After having described the functioning of ex ante courts as en-
couraging pre-deliberations, I now turn to ex post courts' internal
organizational culture.
III. Ex POST COURTS
This Part focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court, which I take as the
paragon ex post court, with occasional additional examples drawn
from the U.K. Supreme Court. The ex post decision-making process
unfolds in three successive phases: the pre-conference case prepara-
tion and oral argument, followed by the conference meeting, and
lastly the post-conference stage leading to the writing of one or sev-
eral opinions.
A. The Pre-Conference Phase
1. Certiorari
At common law, multimember courts are supposed to be "hot" in
the sense that the responsibility for the case should rest equally upon
all members of the panel.10 9 By contrast, in so-called "cold" courts
most judges lack the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the
briefs and records before the case is argued, because each case is pre-
assigned to one judge. According to the hot court paradigm, the reso-
lution of each matter should be the result of a group effort. Every
judge should read and study the briefs, perform research, and pre-
pare memos before oral argument. The rationale behind this
organization method is that all the judges should have the opportu-
nity to obtain firsthand knowledge of a case rather than learning
about it from one judge who may have already formed preconceived
notions about its merits.
Ultimately, the court's temperature, to carry the metaphor fur-
ther, is dependent on the existence of a reporting judge. In an ex post
court, the judge assigned the task of writing the court's (or the major-
ity's) opinion is not selected until the conference meeting. The writingjudge has a fundamentally different role from that of the ex ante
107. See supra note 88.
108. See Jean-Francois de Montgolfier, Conference Paper: La motivation des d~ci-
sions du Conseil constitutionnel, presented at the conference "La motivation desd~cisions des cours souveraines" ["Reason-Giving in the High Courts"], Conseil consti-
tutionnel, Paris (June 24, 2011).
109. See ALDISERT, supra note 49, at ch. 3 (distinguishing between hot and cold
courts).
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courts' reporting judge, who manages a case from the very beginning
and presents it to his colleagues, thus enjoying the prerogative of
framing the issues. The writing judge can claim no special ownership
of the case-other judges have undertaken their own study and re-
search and remain equally involved with all the cases, at least until
the conference meeting. Unlike the reporting judge, the writing judge
who is subsequently designated knows the views of her colleagues
before she begins drafting the court's opinion. The British Law Lord
interviewed for this project had experienced both cold and hot courts,
having served on the Court of Appeal (a cold court) before joining the
U.K. Supreme Court (a hot court). He confided:
[M]y experience is, and most people's experience is, when
there is a single judgment, particularly if someone has been
nominated beforehand, there is a great tendency for the
others not to study the case as well as they should .... I
think the intellectual input is greater if you have more peo-
ple doing the reading and the writing. 110
What the writing judge loses in exclusivity, she gains in indepen-
dence. The author of a majority opinion speaks for the majority, not
for the full court or panel. She is entitled to her own writing and ju-
risprudential style so long as she does not deviate too much from the
collective position agreed upon during the conference. Unlike the re-
porting judge, she need not please all of her colleagues, but only
secure enough votes for a given disposition.
It is debatable whether the U.S. Supreme Court currently func-
tions as a hot court. It might have been characterized as hot in earlier
times, when each justice was personally involved in all cases, review-
ing every petition that came to the Court.11" ' Nowadays, the Court
has become "warm," at least with regard to the certiorari process. In
the nineteenth century, due to their increasing workload, justices be-
gan to delegate to clerks the task of reviewing cases petitioned to the
Court. Initially, each justice had his own clerks review all petitions.
In 1972, under Chief Justice Burger's leadership, the Court created a
"cert pool" 112 to rationalize the certiorari process. Instead of letting
each chamber prepare its own bench memo for each petition, it estab-
lished that only one clerk at the Court would draft a memo for all
nine justices. 113 Justices still personally study the cases anticipated
110. Interview with Judge J., former Law Lord at the U.K. Supreme Court (March
8, 2012).
111. See ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS' APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS
OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 109 (2006).
112. Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, The Role of Law Clerks in the U.S. Su-
preme Court's Agenda-Setting Process, 40 Am. Pol. Res. 147 (2012).
113. See Barbara Palmer, The "Bermuda Triangle?" The Cert. Pool and Its Influ-
ence over the Supreme Court's Agenda, 18 CONST. COMMENTARY 105 (2001). Since the
inception of the new system, one or more recalcitrant justices have consistently re-
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to be important or contentious. In addition to receiving the pool
memos presenting a disinterested analysis of the issues, they have
their own procedure for giving the petitions a second look.
Justices meet weekly in private conference to go over the latest
batch of new petitions and decide which, if any, to accept. 114 For a
case to be accepted and placed on the docket for decision, it requires
the vote of four justices. 115 No law clerk or any other staff members
are present at these conferences. There usually is only one go-around,
with discussion and voting taking place simultaneously. For each
case, following the seniority order, each justice makes a few com-
ments and announces his or her vote. While the full Court is present
to decide on cert petitions, the meeting does not constitute a forum
for deliberation, given that the justices do not elaborate their reasons
for admitting a case or not. If there is any discussion, it pertains to
the question of whether cert should be granted, not to the merits of
the case.116 Neither before nor during the cert conference, therefore,
do we see much deliberation. During this phase, most of the thinking
and debating takes place in small groups, within each chamber.
Over the past twenty years or so, the Court has decided on aver-
age no more than eighty cases per term, allowing it to function as a
hot court once cert has been granted. After that, justices have the
time to study the briefs and the record in each case. Clerks help pre-
pare for the oral argument by writing so-called bench memos
submitting the case and the arguments on all sides to analysis.
Bench memos contain substantial details of fact and often a recom-
mendation from the clerk for a decision on the merits.11 7 After
reading the bench memos, it is customary for justices to discuss the
case orally with their clerks. Justice Kennedy thus disclosed that he
likes "to talk through the cases with [his] clerks," and models his in-
teractions with them on the "discursive" exchanges between
barristers and judges in England, where informal oral argument can
fused to take part in the pool. The clerks of a non-participating justice look at every
petition. Currently Justice Alito is the only justice who is not part of the pool; he left it
in 2008, two years after his arrival on the Court. Before him, Stevens, Marshall, Bren-
nan and Stewart also did not take part in the pool. Adam Liptak, A Second Justice
Opts out of a Longtime Custom: The Cert. Pool, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008).
114. In Court parlance, the word "conference" is used to designate both the certio-
rari meetings and the conferences on the merits of cases which have already been
heard. For the purposes of this Article, I reserve the word "conference" for the latter
and refer to the former as the "cert conference."
115. See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 296-300 (8th ed.
2012).
116. For particularly important cases, it has been reported that some justices may
attempt to coordinate in advance to ensure that they have enough votes to either
admit or block a case. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 121 (1998).
117. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 111, at 3.
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last days as the precedents are consulted and discussed. 1 18 Justices
are fully informed by the time oral arguments are scheduled.
2. Oral argument
Oral arguments are considerably more important in ex post
courts than in ex ante courts. There is a historical reason for this, as I
argue below: in the common law tradition, appellate and supreme
courts mainly accomplished their business from the bench. 119 In the
U.K., oral argument still plays an essential role. English barristers
spend a great deal of time presenting the record and the relevant case
law for the judges' benefit. 120 The hearing is the principal informa-
tion-gathering resource for judges. The role of oral arguments at the
U.S. Supreme Court is more controversial. Arguments run on two-
week blocks, followed by recesses during which the justices work on
opinions and get ready for new arguments. Despite the brevity of the
hour-long oral arguments, the justices are very active. They partici-
pate in dialogue with counsels in open session, rarely letting them
speak for long before interrupting them with questions. These ques-
tions have an information-gathering or clarification purpose, but
sometimes the justices raise new issues. 12 '
Is oral argument a form of preliminary conference for deciding
the case? It is the first time that all the justices meet face-to-face to
examine the merits of a case, as the cert conference merely focuses on
the appropriateness of selecting a case. Scholars of the U.S. Supreme
Court and commentators disagree as to the argument's predictive ef-
fect on case outcomes.1 22 Justices seem to use oral arguments not
only to obtain additional information from the parties, but also some-
times to engage in a dialogue with their brethren. A former law clerk,
who later argued cases before the Court, gave the following account of
oral arguments: "Frequently I had this happen to me: sometimes it's
not an oral argument between the lawyers, it's a debate between the
justices trying to persuade the justices who are undecided. 1 2 3 For-
mer Chief Justice Rehnquist described oral argument as a forum for
justices to influence their colleagues' analysis and possibly sway their
118. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., When High Court's Away, Clerks' Work Begins, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/23/us/the-law-when-high-
court-s-away-clerks-work-begins.html.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 139-143.
120. ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED
STATES 120 (1990).
121. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 22-23 (2004).
122. But see id. at 122-23 (arguing based on empirical data that justices use oral
arguments to gather information regarding legal and policy options in a case).
123. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with M., law clerk at the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1957-1958 (Dec. 7, 2010).
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vote at the conference that will follow shortly thereafter. 124 In the
same vein, journalist Adam Liptak reported Chief Justice Roberts'
recent declaration that "[w]hen we get out on the bench, it's really the
first time we start to get some clues about what our colleagues think.
So we often are using questions to bring out points that we think our
colleagues ought to know about."1 25 In the same article, Liptak
quoted Justice Kagan stating "that part of what oral argument is
about is a little bit of the justices talking to each other with some
helpless person standing at the podium who you're talking through."
Despite these declarations, it is hard to see a real deliberation
taking place during oral arguments. Each justice seems to approach
the audience in an idiosyncratic manner, without prior consultation
with colleagues. One extreme example is Justice Thomas, who is fa-
mous for his nearly unbroken silence during arguments. According to
him, arguments are "overrated,... mak[ing] for a good show, but...
not altogether significant in the outcome.' 26 To conclude, then, oral
arguments are sometimes indicative of a nascent dialogue, but Jus-
tices do not openly and directly share their views on the case until the
post-argument conference.
B. The Conference and Post-Conference Phase
As Supreme Court expert Bernard Schwartz notes, "[tihe deci-
sion process begins after the oral arguments when the Justices meet
in conference to discuss the case."' 27 Justices' primary goal for the
post-argument conference is to reach a collective decision on the out-
come of a case, not on the rationale supporting that outcome. It is
only after the conference that the articulation of reasons begins
through the opinion-writing process. The conference represents a
starting point for deliberations, rather than a finishing point as in ex
ante courts.
1. The Conference
The rules of the U.S. Supreme Court say nothing about confer-
ence meetings, not even that they must take place at all. Their
duration, operating procedure, degree of privacy, etc., are all left to
custom and to the justices themselves to determine. As a matter of
practice, the justices hold a conference during the week of an argu-
ment sitting to discuss and vote on current cases. The content of
these meetings is confidential. Unlike what we have seen at certain
124. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 243-44 (2001).
125. Adam Liptak, A Most Inquisitive Court? No Argument There, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/1O/08/us/inquisitive-justices-no-argument-
there.html.
126. See David G. Savage, Say the Right Thing, 83 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 54, 56.
127. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES
(1996) (emphasis added).
984 [Vol. 62
EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST DELIBERATIONS
ex ante courts, the only people allowed in the room are the nine jus-
tices. Clerks are excluded.
Procedure. The standard account of the conference's operating
procedure is the following. 128 The Chief Justice directs the order of
business, opening the discussion of every case, summarizing the facts
and raising the issues. The senior Associate Justice speaks next and
the sequence that ensues follows seniority. There generally appears
to be no open discussion or effort to persuade others to change their
views. The exchange of ideas proceeds seriatim. Participants do not
debate the merits of one another's positions and do not attempt to
reformulate their own views so as to make them more palatable to
the group. 129 The Chief Justice assigns the task of writing the court
opinion on whichever side he supports. The most senior Associate
Justice voting in favor of the other side assigns the minority opinion.
Unlike reporting judges who have committed considerable time and
energy to a case, no justice at an ex post court can claim superior
knowledge of the case at this stage. As a former clerk noted, the jus-
tices "come [to the conference] all prepared. They are almost ready to
write an opinion"' 30 In principle, therefore, any Justice can be desig-
nated to write the Court's opinion.
Terseness. Despite variations over time, since Chief Justice
Hughes's tenure (1930-1941) conferences have been notoriously short
and to the point. Discussions are kept to a minimum. The conference
has sometimes been described as a voting chamber rather than a fo-
rum for deliberation. 13 1 As both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia have complained, the conference is less an interactive ex-
change of views than a succession of short statements of their
position by each Justice. 13 2 The fact that Justices often announce
their vote on the case at the same time as they express the reasons
justifying that vote may discourage deliberation. Indicating one's
vote before hearing the reasoned analyses of one's colleagues makes
128. For this description, I rely on THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE
(1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECI-
SIONS, supra note 29.
129. In practice, it appears that no formal vote takes places at the end of the dis-
cussion of a case: each justice's vote surfaces during the go-around. See SCHWARTZ,
supra note 127, at 44. Similarly, at the U.K. Supreme Court, the Law Lords appar-
ently often forgo voting altogether. According to the Law Lord interviewed for this
project, "[Ylou don't need to have a vote. Unless somebody decides to change their
mind, it's pretty clear as we go around what the result is going to be. We don't have a
formal vote." Interview with Judge J., supra note 110.
130. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with L., law clerk at the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2007-2008 (Dec. 3, 2010).
131. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 127, at 85 (quoting Justice Frankfurter, who re-
lated that for former Chief Justice Hughes, "'the conference was not a debating
society.' When differences began to produce more heat than analysis, the Chief Jus-
tice would blow his whiskers out and say, 'Brethren, the only way to settle this is to
vote"').
132. Id. at 42-43.
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it less likely that others' views will change one's mind.133 Michael
McConnell, who clerked for Justice Brennan in the 1980-1981 term
and later served as a circuit judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, has claimed that:
[jiudicial decision-making contains very little serious delib-
eration on moral issues....
Nor, I believe, has there been much more moral deliber-
ation behind the curtains. The Justices are far too busy to
spend much time thinking about the cases, and their confer-
ences are largely perfunctory. Certainly they have no time to
do the kind of outside reading they would need to become
able to contribute to moral-political deliberation in a serious
way. In contrast to the months, even years, that are devoted
to major legislative deliberation, the Justices devote one
hour to oral argument and somewhat less than that to dis-
cussion at conference. Amazingly, they do not even wait to
see what the dissenting opinion has to say before joining the
majority. The appearance of debate and deliberation created
by the opinions is largely a sham.'3 4
The Chief. The personality of the Chief Justice plays a determin-
ing role in shaping the tone and content of the conference. Some
Chiefs are known for having fostered longer and livelier encounters
than others. Conferences were particularly to the point under
Hughes's and Rehnquist's tenures. 135 Chief Justice Roberts is said to
have continued Rehnquist's legacy since his arrival in 2005, though
according to Justice Scalia, in an effort to promote collegiality among
justices, he lets "people go on a little longer at conference."' 36 A for-
mer clerk questions Roberts' proclaimed efforts to foster
collaboration:
I don't believe him. I think he wants to get a court that
makes his judgments. The question is how fast or how slow
he wants to move. I think this is a strategic question....
He's been the part of many opinions that reached out to de-
133. But far from impossible, of course. Justices have long been known to occasion-
ally switch votes well after the decision conference. See, e.g., Robert H. Dorff & Saul
Brenner, Conformity Voting on the United States Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 762
(1992).
134. Michael McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1536-37 (1989).
135. See REHNQUIST, supra note 124, at 254-255, 258.
136. Quoted in David A. Yalof, Joey Mello & Patrick Schmidt, Collegiality on the
U.S. Supreme Court: An Early Assessment of the Roberts Court, 95 JUDICATURE 12, 13(2011). But some Chiefs have been known for a more relaxed style-for instance,
Stone. See ScHwARTz, supra note 127, at 86.
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cide things that they needn't decide if you really cared about
unanimity.137
History. The U.K. Supreme Court and the House of Lords before
it seems even less keen on collective deliberations: "After the formal
hearing the members of the committee may consult informally but do
not hold a formal series of meetings in the manner of other supreme
courts designed to produce a collective view."'1 38 History may partly
explain why ex post courts' conference meetings are so terse. In the
English tradition, appellate judges and Law Lords used to deliver
their opinions seriatim from the bench at the conclusion of oral argu-
ment. The judges announced their decision without any prior
consultation among themselves other than indirectly through the
questioning of counsel and occasional whispering from the bench. The
hearing itself was the conference. Until relatively recently, Law
Lords did not conference in private before announcing their views
from the bench. 139 Parties and the public could literally see judges
making up their minds: pausing to read documents and think in si-
lence, taking notes, looking up precedents, reading them out loud,
interrogating counsel, etc. 140 One of the persistent themes in common
law thinking is that justice must be seen to be done in order to be
done. This oral conception of judicial accountability led to favoring
speech as the dominant mode of communication in court proceedings.
Each step of the litigation process was to take place in open court so
that the public could observe not only the presentation of evidence
and counsels' arguments, but also judges' making their decision and
stating their reasons. 141 According to this speech-centered legal pro-
cess, if judges hid from the public eye to discuss and decide cases, a
crucial aspect of judicial accountability would be missing. The gov-
ernment or one of their own could unduly influence them. Seriatim
opinions provided assurance that each judge had done his own think-
ing. Thomas Jefferson, a virulent opponent of judges meeting in
private conferences and delivering unanimous opinions, contended
137. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with 0., law clerk at the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1978-1979 (Oct. 21, 2011).
138. John Alder, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?, 20 OXFORD. J.
LEGAL STUD. 221, 233 (2000). See also DAVID ROBERTSON, JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN THE
HOUSE OF LORDS, ch. 2 (1998).
139. Interview with Judge J., supra note 110 ("All I do know is that in the 1920s,
possibly before and a little after, the judges didn't even discuss what results there
[were] going to be.").
140. It should also be noted that before the transformation of the judicial functions
of the House of Lords into an independent Supreme Court in 2009, judicial opinions
were technically speeches addressed to the Houses of Parliament and recommending a
particular result in the case.
141. Daniel J. Meador, English Appellate Judges from an American Perspective, 66
GEO. L.J. 1349, 1363 (1978) (describing the visibility of the Court of Appeal's proceed-
ings and comparing the courtroom to a "workroom").
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that "[t]he practice is certainly convenient for the lazy, the modest &
the incompetent."1 42
The Origin of the Conference. How did ex post courts come to in-
stitute conference meetings? Legal scholars point to Lord Mansfield
as a pioneer. As the Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1776
to 1788, he briefly imposed the usage for Law Lords to meet in pri-
vate before delivering the court's opinion. 143 But his successors
returned to the seriatim practice, which persisted well into the twen-
tieth century.' 44 The U.S. Supreme Court initially modeled its
operating procedure on the British example. Its first decisions fol-
lowed the seriatim style, 145 suggesting that conference meetings may
not have taken place at all. Todd Henderson argues that the Chief
Judge of the Virginia Court of Appeals from 1778 to 1803, Edmund
Pendleton, a Mansfield admirer, introduced to the United States the
practice of judges meeting behind closed doors and delivering unani-
mous opinions. 146 But in Virginia too, seriatim opinions were quickly
reinstated after Pendleton stepped down. 147 It was not until John
Marshall became the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1801
that the practice of conferencing was institutionalized. For judges to
meet privately in order to discuss cases and negotiate a common posi-
tion was still quite revolutionary at the time.1 48 The Supreme Court's
humble beginnings encouraged conferencing. The Court did not have
its own building until 1935. In the days of John Marshall
(1801-1835), justices formed a close-knit community as they shared a
142. Quoted in Donald G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent, 3 WM. &
MARY Q. 353, 355 (1953).
143. See M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A The-
ory of Dissent, 2007 Sup. CT. REV. 283, 294.
144. Id. at 302. Today, Law Lords conference privately much like their American
counterparts. See ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 93 (1982) [hereinafter PATERSON(1982)] (noting that conferences usually last only half an hour or so, and only excep-
tionally have exceeded this). See also ALAN PATERSON, FINAL JUDGMENT: THE LAST
LAw LORDS AND THE SUPREME COURT 87 (2013) (reporting that the Law Lords' confer-
encing practices have not.changed significantly since the transformation of the House
of Lords into the U.K. Supreme Court in 2009).
145. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
779-80 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
146. See Henderson, supra note 143, at 304.
147. See Morgan, supra note 142, at 362:
At the close of the day's ritual, they returned to their common quarters, a
boardinghouse. There, led by their benign abbot, they conversed on affairs of
the day; there they interspersed between remarks about counsel and gossip
of the bumptious young capital a running commentary on the cases before
them. In this informal and altogether pleasant manner, they reached com-
mon agreement on decisions. Admittedly, regular consultations did take
place at the court chamber, and frequently far into the evening, but these, it
would appear, were auxiliary to the cheerful sessions at the dinner table or in
the parlor.
148. And Jefferson opposed it fervently. Cited by Henderson, supra note 143, at
304.
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basement below the Senate in lieu of chambers during the day and a
boarding house at night.149 During the Court's term, the justices thus
had constant opportunities to meet and discuss cases privately.' 50
While this level of intimacy may be long since passed, these days
lively intra- and inter-chamber deliberations occur during the post-
conference phase.
2. The Post-Conference Phase
Between the decision conference and the publication of the
Court's opinion, weeks and sometimes months can go by. What goes
on during that time? According to a former clerk, "nothing happens
until the draft is circulated. From what I can tell, there is not a lot of
talking."' 5 As Supreme Court observer Linda Greenhouse has
pointed out, the image of the Supreme Court as a "high-level debat-
ing society," where the justices sit around and engage in endless
discussions about cases is inaccurate:
Except when they are on the bench or at their twice-weekly
conferences, the justices spend most of their working day
alone in their chambers, or in their chambers with their law
clerks. They don't pop in to one another's officers to chew
over some interesting idea. Their interactions are quite for-
mal, usually on paper.152
Unlike British judges who spend most of their time in open court
conducting and deciding adversary proceedings, American justices
work alone, or with their clerks. As Justice Powell famously put it,
the U.S. Supreme Court operates as nine small law firms, with each
justice playing the role of senior partner and law clerks that of junior
associates. 15 3 The physical arrangements of the Court encourage this
state of affairs. Now that the Court has its own building on Capitol
Hill, each justice enjoys her own headquarters. The word "chamber"
has acquired a metaphorical meaning, designating both the team of
people working with a justice and the physical location of a justice's
office within the courthouse. Each chamber constitutes a microcosm,
as a former law clerk suggested: "Each chamber had its own living
environment. We had our own bathroom, our own closets, coffee
maker, refrigerator. Some chambers were known for their better
snacks."' 54 The chamber system isolates the justices, who only meet
149. Morgan, supra note 142, at 362.
150. Id. at 354.
151. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with 0., supra note 137.
152. Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, N.Y. Times (July 13, 2008), http://www.ny
times.com/2008/07/13/weekinreview/131inda.html.
153. DAVID 0' BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
122 (1986) (quoting Powell, J.).
154. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with L., supra note 130.
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face-to-face with one another during conferences and oral arguments.
But does this isolation mean that no debate or group discussions take
place at the Court? I argue that a form of post-deliberation occurs
during the post-conference stage.
Unlike ex ante judicial cultures, which structure interactions by
compelling debates between the reporting judge and other decision-
makers, the justices in ex post cultures are on their own. Writing jus-
tices do not need to account to a check judge. They do not receive
feedback and requests for edits from justices who voted for the other
side. They are spared the admonitions of an Advocate General. Their
drafts do not run the risk of being censured by a jurisconsult. All in
all, justices are far more akin to independent professionals than are
their European counterparts. But it does not follow that justices ab-
stain from engaging in mutual justification. The post-conference
writing stage routinely involves small group deliberations, either in-
tra-chamber, i.e., between a justice and his clerks, or inter-chamber,
i.e., between two or more chambers.
a. Intra-Chamber Deliberations
Even when a writing justice chooses to disengage from other jus-
tices, her confinement is relative given that she remains surrounded
by her clerks. A former clerk described his chamber in the following
way: "[I]n a way, each six of us was an extension of him [the justice]
in different ways. That's true as well of clerks for other justices." 155
Often the opinion-writing is the result of a collaborative process be-
tween the justice and her law clerks. After argument, a clerk for the
justice who has received the opinion-writing assignment will do more
research and perhaps, depending on the justice's work methods, write
a first draft. Two layers of discussion occur at the intra-chamber
level: between co-clerks and between the justice and her clerks. The
chamber reproduces some of the exchanges we have seen at the ex
ante courts. A writing justice can play the role of a check judge with
respect to the work accomplished by his clerks, when he reviews and
edits the opinions they have prepared. Conversely, he can remain in
charge of the first draft and require from his clerks that they play the
role of a devil's advocate to test his views, much like junior Advocates
General. 156 Some chambers seem to function like mini-seminars,
favoring group discussions:
155. Id. (the "six of us" refers to each justice's four clerks and two secretaries).
156. Alexander Bickel, who clerked for Justice Frankfurter in 1952-1953, re-
counted that Frankfurter demanded that his clerks contest and dispute his
perspective. See LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY
416 (1984). See also WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 111, at 42 (quoting a Frankfurter
clerk as having declared, "We regarded it as part of our job when we disagreed with
him.").
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when she [the justice] would get an assignment .... [a clerk]
would draft the opinion. She would meet informally with the
clerk and say "That's what I want the outcome to be. So I
want it to say X, Y, and Z." But with her, it was usually
pretty general and the clerks had a lot of freedom to decide
how the opinion was going to be written. And then she would
read the draft and make her comments in the margins....
We would keep going on with those drafts and she also had
the practice of having us circulate our drafts with our co-
clerks. So the other three clerks would read the drafts and
provide our feedback .... And there were some cases when
clerks would write counter-memos to the justice or would
suggest [substantive changes] to the justice because there
was a conflict between the clerks. 157
b. Inter-Chamber Deliberations
Outside of the conference setting, justices engage in various
forms of contact with one another, both face-to-face-at lunches and
other social occasions or in privately arranged meetings in pairs or
trios-and through the intermediary of their clerks or communica-
tion technologies such as telephone or e-mail.
The writing justice carries the burden of internal advocacy, and
is instructed to write the opinion with the ultimate goal of persuading
other members of the Court to accept his point of view. He can expect
surprises when his draft makes the rounds for approval. The non-
writing justices may have concerns about the draft. This is the time
when exchanges closest to the democratic deliberation model may
take place. They will rarely change their minds, but during this pe-
riod, a justice may attempt to alter the strategy or reasoning
expressed by an opinion or persuade others to change their initial
votes. Proposed dissenting opinions circulate as well at this time, and
sometimes prove compelling enough to convert a justice who was ini-
tially in the majority. A former clerk explained, "[I]t also happens
when opinions get circulated that justices will change their minds
and will decide 'Well this dissent doesn't make my point or this ma-
jority doesn't make a point I want to make, so I am going to
concur." ' 158 Inter-chamber communications are all the more
animated when the writing justice believes that she may be short by
one vote. By contrast, if she is confident that she can rely on a solid
majority, there may be no discussion at all. Another clerk reported:
157. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with K., law clerk at the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2002-2003 (Nov. 29, 2010).
158. Id.
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If you don't have to hang onto a vote, or if it doesn't really
matter, then you write it the way you think.... And then the
draft is circulated among the Court. People sign and send
back slips saying count me in, or I dissent, or can you change
this? That's done with little slips of paper, which is the first
page of opinion folded into thirds. 15 9
Post-conference discussions do not seem to take place face-to-face
most of the time, but rather through communications mediated by
clerks or the exchange of memos. A clerk thus recounted: "There was
some communication in person but that was rare. They [the justices]
would rather send memos rather than e-mail. They would have their
clerks type the memo and then send it."160 Another clerk pointed out
that if there is an active inter-chamber discussion during the opinion-
writing stage, "mostly it is done from clerks to clerks and then up to
the justice. So you are writing this and you go to Justice S.'s clerk and
you would say: 'I think I have to handle it this way. What would your
boss think if I did this?"" 6' In their book on the Supreme Court,
Artemus Ward and David Weiden have called this form of communi-
cation the "clerk network."1 62 Law clerks get to know other clerks
and gather information about other justices' thinking and writing
process. They report back to their justice who can adjust her own
thinking and writing accordingly. The clerk network is so crucial to
the Court's internal organization that it affects clerk hiring. Accord-
ing to a former clerk, his justice "really wanted people who would be
good emissaries among the clerks .... He wanted people who could
really function well among the clerks."163 As a result, this justice in-
sisted on hiring politically moderate clerks who could easily get along
with clerks from other chambers. 164
To conclude, ex post courts do not seem to deliberate much before
or during the oral argument and the conference. They do engage in
post-deliberations during the opinion-writing stage, but do these ex-
changes amount to deliberations in the sense favored by deliberative
theorists? The next Part compares the deliberative theory with actual
judicial practices at both ex ante and ex post courts.
159. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with 0., supra note 137.
160. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with K., supra note 157.
161. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with 0., supra note 137.
162. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 111, at 4, 160 (arguing, at 4, that "[diuring
the voting and coalition-formation stage, clerks act as informal ambassadors across
chambers and make recommendations based on information they get through this
'clerk network."').
163. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with L., supra note 130.
164. Id.
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IV. PRE- AND POST-DELIBERATIONS
So far the goal of this Article has been to present two organiza-
tional cultures. Based on this account, the question now is whether
courts of last resort are internally deliberative in the sense favored by
deliberative theorists. This Part claims that high court judges do
much of the work imagined by the deliberative theory model, but not
within the bounds of the conference that is typically assumed to ex-
emplify the deliberative effort. Justices "pre-deliberate" or "post-
deliberate" rather than simply deliberating. Most of the decision-
making occurs through multiple forms of contacts and interconnec-
tions within small groups, including non-judicial personnel, rather
than in full court or full panel face-to-face encounters.
A. Falling Short of the Deliberative Ideal?
This section outlines three ways in which high courts may di-
verge from the deliberative ideal delineated in Part I: (1) decision-
makers are not always on an equal footing, (2) collective face-to-face
meetings are relatively rare events, and (3) docket pressure some-
times interferes with full-fledged deliberations.
1. Lack of Equal Participation
The deliberative ideal is based on a principle of equal participa-
tion, according to which every participant's perspective should be
taken into account because it is valuable in and of itself. Courts differ
from polities in that they do not necessarily aspire to being internally
democratic. Their goal is not primarily to reflect the views of all those
involved but to get the right answer, measured against standards
which are usually outside the debate itself. As a result, not every
court member's views deserve equal respect and consideration. Some
are considered worthier than others, for example because they are
more in line with precedents or reflect a specific form of expertise. In
that sense, courts are elitist not because judges are unelected but be-
cause they constitute a professional environment revolving around
expert knowledge. This knowledge-based differentiation goes hand in
hand with various forms of inequalities between the individuals who
take part in court decisions. The institutional design and organiza-
tional culture of high courts create differential levels of status
between judges, on the one hand, and between judges and other court
personnel, on the other hand. These differences mean that those who
participate in the decision will not always have equal opportunities to
influence the outcome. More specifically, authority relations may dis-
turb the cooperative and egalitarian nature of the decision process, be
it by virtue of real hierarchies, functionally differentiated assign-
ments, or differences in experience or expertise.
99320141
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At four of the six high courts discussed in this Article (the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Conseil constitutionnel, the ECtHR, and the
CJEU), a non-hierarchical organization of judicial personnel is in
place. All judges are hired on the same terms and share the same
employment status. There is one qualification, though. Courts of last
resort are presided over by chief judicial officers, be they known as
the "Chief Justice," the "President," or the "Vice-President.' 65 Theo-
retically, a court's chief judicial officer is only primus inter pares (first
among equals), not a superior to whom other judges must report. 166
The chief should enjoy no special privilege in influencing case out-
comes, having only one vote in the conference, just like the other
judges. 167 However, in practice, as noted earlier, chiefs do not lack
opportunities for leadership.' 68 Their agenda-setting role gives them
the upper hand in framing the issues, given that they preside over
conference discussions, where they open the debate before the other
judges have the opportunity to speak.' 69 Through their administra-
tive functions-such as the authority to choose the reporting judge or
the writing judge-they wield special influence in the conference and
other inner workings of the court. Naturally, the style of leadership
varies from chief to chief, with some being more controlling than
others, e.g., playing a dominant role during conference and leading
the discussion toward their preferred outcome. 170
In contrast, the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de cassation openly
rely on a hierarchical organization, as different types of judicial ten-
ure tracks are in place. Distinctions exist between junior and senior
judges in employment terms, salary, title, and sometimes even deci-
sion-making abilities. For instance, the Cour de cassation includes
two main categories of membership: 17' senior judges, known as
"heavy councilors" (conseillers lourds), who are fully tenured mem-
165. Some courts also have deputy presidents (e.g., the U.K. Supreme Court) or
vice presidents (e.g., the CJEU and ECtHR), in addition to a president.
166. Regarding the Chief Justice of the United States, see SCHWARTZ, supra note
127, at 74 (reporting that Justice Frankfurter once wrote that the Chief Justice is
emphatically not "the boss" of the Court).
167. This is not the case at the Conseil constitutionnel, where the President does
have the decisive vote. See Const. art. 56 (Fr.).
168. See supra note 129 and text accompanying notes 128-131.
169. At courts where cases are decided by panels rather than by the full court, the
court's President may not participate in every decision. In that scenario, the panel's
presiding judge endorses an agenda-setting role.
170. At the U.S. Supreme Court, famous examples of "heavyweight" chiefs include
Justices John Marshall and Earl Warren. In France, President Robert Badinter was
known for systematically winning his colleagues over to his views. See MAURICE
FAURE in conversation with CHRISTIAN DELACAMPAGNE, D'uNE RPPUBLIQUE A L'AUTRE:
ENTRETIENS SUR L'HISTOIRE ET SUR LA POLITIQUE 129 (1999).
171. In addition, the Cour de cassation has also begun recruiting a few judges from
outside the judiciary, based on their specific expertise, e.g., trade unionists, academ-
ics, and high-ranking civil servants. They hold the title of conseillers en service
extraordinaire.
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bers of the court; and apprentice-like judges, the conseillers
rdfrrendaires, who come from the regular judiciary and are placed on
a temporary assignment in the court. 17 2 The conseillers r6frrendaires
are dispatched to one of the court's chambers and assume the func-
tions of reporting judges. While they attend all of their chamber's
conference meetings, they are only allowed to vote on the cases which
they personally reported. In all other cases, they are allowed to con-
tribute to the collective discussion but prohibited from casting a vote.
Even where there is no hierarchy among court members, the in-
ternal organizational culture may lead to an imbalance of influence.
The effective contribution of individual judges varies from case to
case regardless of how well they justify their views to one another.
For instance, the division of labor between the reporting judge or the
writing judge, on the one hand, and the rest of the panel, on the
other, can bestow an advantage on the former. Panel members may
be particularly susceptible to framing effects given that they are less
likely to conduct their own independent research when a case has
been pre-assigned to a reporting judge. 173 The reporting judge's in-
depth familiarity with the details of the case, and sometimes also
with the area of law, allows her to present the issues in a way that
favors her preferred disposition. 174 In ex post courts, the writing
judge may have the upper hand on an opinion not so much because
she enjoys a cognitive advantage but rather due to strategic consider-
ations. So long as she can maintain a sufficiently strong coalition, she
can shape the breadth and depth of the opinion through her choice of
arguments. An imbalance of influence can also result from factors
such as the sequence in which participants speak during the confer-
ence. Some courts use an order determined by seniority (i.e., with the
court's presiding judge and the most senior judge leading off) and
others by inverse seniority (with the most junior judge speaking
first). Either sequence could either undermine or further equality, de-
pending on whether we think that age is a proxy for authority or that
the person who speaks first or last exerts greater influence.
172. The conseillers rdfdrendaires are entry-level or mid-career lower court judges,
who can serve for a maximum of ten years. Though they must leave the court after
that, they are given priority status to reenter the Cour de cassation as conseillers
lourds later in their career. A similar system exists at the Supreme Court of Japan.
See Masako Kamiya, "Ch6sakan". Research Judges Toiling at the Stone Fortress, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. (Special Issue: Decision Making on the Japanese Supreme Court)
1601 (2011).
173. For two seminal articles on framing effects, see Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453
(1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Deci-
sions, 59 J. Bus. S251 (1986).
174. That explains why ex ante courts have built-in bias-alleviating safeguards
such as check judges, Advocates General, jurisconsults, preliminary meetings, etc. See
supra Part II.
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In addition to these differences among judges, there also exist
important asymmetries between judges and the non-judicial person-
nel who participate in the decision process. According to the
deliberative theory, all participants in a deliberation should have
equal opportunities to influence the outcome, or at least have the
ability to participate in the deliberation on equal terms. But who
should be counted as the relevant deliberators in high courts? In
courts where staff lawyers or clerks take an active part in the deci-
sion-making process it would be disingenuous to maintain that
judges are the sole decision-makers. Courts decide cases through
small groups which have permeable boundaries. These small groups
may include judges who are not members of the deciding panel, staff
attorneys, clerks, interns, translators, and other support person-
nel.175 At the U.S. Supreme Court, the CJEU, and the ECtHR, where
clerks and registry lawyers play a major research and writing role,
non-judicial personnel are clearly involved in deliberations. Clerks
and lawyers are often included-if not in charge of-the initial deci-
sion to admit a case, the preliminary research, the drafting of
opinions, and the negotiation with other chambers. Their contribu-
tion is problematic from the perspective of deliberative theory,
however, because they do not enjoy decision-making equality with
judges. Even though they participate in myriad ways in the decision-
making process and contribute to the reasoning that carries the day,
they are denied the formal authority to decide cases. They are not
even considered members of the deliberative body. Significantly, they
are never allowed to vote in any of the courts reviewed here, and are
excluded from the deliberation room at the CJEU and the U.S. Su-
preme Court. At the ECtHR, registry lawyers routinely attend
conference meetings, but their difference in status is marked in mul-
tiple ways, from their seat assignment to the fact that they may only
speak if called on by the judges.
Deliberative democracy grounds its legitimacy in part on deliber-
ators' capacity to justify their views to one another rather than on
their status, numbers, or other arbitrary advantages. An occasional
imbalance of influence among judges does not necessarily reflect a
failure of the model of democratic deliberation so long as it is consis-
tent with the demand that all think about the matter and come to a
conclusion. That the non-judicial personnel involved in courts' deci-
sions lack the ability to participate in deliberations on equal terms,
however, is a clearer departure from the model.
175. While U.S. Supreme Court Justices and CJEU judges have law clerks specifi-
cally attached to their chambers whom they hire personally, the interns, legal
assistants, and staff lawyers at the three French courts of last resort and the ECtHR
are selected bureaucratically by ad hoc committees. The CJEU and the ECtHR also
employ a number of translators who are usually also lawyers in their own right and
may have a role in shaping the substance of a judgment.
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2. The Disappearing Conference
Face-to-face meetings have long been considered both the norm
and the most effective mode of communication for groups to discuss
problems and make decisions within organizations. As we have seen,
high courts have been depicted as havens for these types of ex-
changes. In particular, the conference, which convenes all deciding
judges in quiet seclusion, is thought to epitomize the virtues of these
face-to-face meetings. The conference, however, has too often been as-
sumed to be the most significant step in the decision-making process.
The assumption is that the conference has a direct effect upon the
decision: minds are changed, minority views become majority views,
and vice versa. However, as Parts II and III have shown, the deliber-
ative importance of the conference has been overstated, in both ex
ante and ex post courts.
In ex ante courts, the conference is an end point. By the time
they get together in the privacy of the conference room, the judges
have already pre-deliberated in small groups. In ex post courts, the
conference is a starting point. It is only after stepping out of the con-
ference room that judges begin to deliberate in small groups. In both
judicial cultures, the conference remains a forum for decision-mak-
ing, but not so much for deliberating. In ex ante courts, the
conference serves to confer a collective stamp of approval on an opin-
ion prepared by a sub-group of the panel. In ex post courts, the
conference serves to determine a majority in favor of a disposition
and to assign the writing of opinions. Ultimately, most of the actual
thinking, talking, persuading, negotiating, refining, polishing, etc.,
takes place either before or after the conference.
The face-to-face component of deliberations is also missing from
much of the courts' interactions. Part of this is due to the peculiar
culture of certain courts and part is due to technological advances. To
some extent, the CJEU and the U.S. Supreme Court eschew face-to-
face communications between judges as a result of their reliance on
the clerk network. 176 Rather than meeting one-on-one or in small
groups to discuss cases in person, judges often rely on their clerks to
conduct informal exchanges of ideas across chambers. As a former
CJEU clerk recounted, "very often it [the pre-conference discussion
on draft opinions] occurs through clerks. When relationships are
good-that's why we spend so much time lunching and partying to-
gether-it's fantastic because you can just give someone a ring saying
'Can I drop by?' and everything happens in a collaborative
manner."
1 77
176. On the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance on clerks for inter-chamber discussions,
see supra text accompanying notes 160-163.
177. Interview by the author and Pasquale Pasquino with former law clerk F.,
supra note 77 (my translation).
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More fundamentally, over the past thirty years, mediated ex-
changes through communication technologies and online interactions
have become commonplace in collaborative work. Just like other or-
ganizations, high courts have taken advantage of this technological
progress. Bernard Schwartz noted twenty years ago that the acquisi-
tion by the U.S. Supreme Court of its first Xerox machine in 1969,
followed by word processors and computers had the effect of reducing
personal exchanges both in conference discussions and in the post-
argument decision-making process. 178 At all six courts studied for
this Article, judges are now able to exchange documents rapidly and
to interact through electronic means using e-mail, electronic dockets
and databases, file-and-application sharing, group decision support
systems, electronic bulletin boards, real-time calendar and schedul-
ing systems, and occasionally teleconferencing. It is so much easier to
send drafts and memos and to give feedback electronically, that medi-
ated exchanges often supplant other forms of face-to-face meetings or
even telephone conversations.
How does online deliberation compare with face-to-face delibera-
tion? The effects of computer-mediated deliberation are still
debated. 17 9 Some researchers are skeptical, arguing that online dis-
cussions are less effective than face-to-face discussions. 18 0 Others
claim that the invisibility associated with mediated interactions
reduces inhibitions and facilitates contributions to the discussion by
all members.181 This equalizing effect would increase the likelihood
that members who disagree with the dominant analysis or more gen-
erally are of unequal status express their views.18 2 This may occur
because face-to-face communications are more cohesive and per-
sonal. 18 3 Electronic technologies attenuate some social cues and
178. Schwartz, supra note 127, at 41.
179. See Seong-Jae Min, Online vs. Face-to-Face Deliberation: Effects on Civic En-
gagement, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1369, 1372 (2007) (pointing out that
very few empirical studies so far have compared the effect of online deliberation with
that of face-to-face deliberation).
180. See, e.g., Boris B. Baltes et al., Computer-Mediated Communication and
Group Decision Making: A Meta-Analysis, 87 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR & HuM. DE-
CISION PROCESSES 156 (2002) (arguing that computer-mediated communication leads
to decreases in group effectiveness, increases in the time required to complete tasks,
and decreases in member satisfaction compared to face-to-face groups).
181. See Sara Kiesler, Jane Siegel & Timothy W. McGuire, Social Psychological
Aspects of Computer-Mediated Communication, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1123 (1984);
Susan G. Straus, Getting A Clue: The Effects of Communication Media and Informa-
tion Distribution on Participation and Performance in Computer-Mediated and Face-
to-Face Groups, 27 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 115 (1996); Ilze Zigurs, M. Scott Poole &
Geraldine L. DeSanctis, A Study of Influence in Computer-Mediated Group Decision
Making, 12 MIS Q. 625 (1988).
182. Robert S. Baron et al., The Eyes Have It: Minority Influence in Face-to-Face
and Computer-Mediated Groups, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 706-18 (1997).
183. See David H. Jonassen & Hyug II Kwon, Communication Patterns in Com-
puter Mediated Versus Face-to-Face Group Problem Solving, 49 EDUC. TECH. RES. &
DEV. 35 (2001) (presenting a study suggesting that face-to face interactions tend to
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therefore mitigate the impact of status differences and subgroup
memberships on participation dynamics.184 Beyond that, as Seana
Shiffrin has suggested, courts' reliance on mediated communication
may reduce some of the deliberative disadvantages of face-to-face
contact, including the distortions introduced when parties' tempers
flare, when one party bullies and the other resists, and when some
judges' egos preclude a public turnabout.18 5 From that perspective,
some measure of indirectness (via e-mail or paper communication) or
mediation (through clerks) may help establish or reestablish deliber-
ative equality among decision-makers of different statuses.1
8 6
To sum up, high courts may be the backdrop to deliberations, but
many of the conversations and exchanges that compose the mutually
justificatory activity take place outside of the conference room: in
small groups, electronically, or through intermediaries. That is not to
say that face-to-face contact is lacking, but that it is not primarily
found in the conference. Rather, judges accumulate face-to-face con-
tact over multiple cases and the passage of years, allowing for
sustained conversations and a sense of mutual accountability that
transcends the conference setting.
3. Caseloads
Until now, I have paid little attention to courts' workload. But
the deliberative ideal lacks verisimilitude for certain courts by virtue
of their skyrocketing dockets. Given their crushing workloads, judges
at the ECtHR, CJEU, Conseil d'Etat, and Cour de cassation cannot
possibly have the time and resources necessary to engage in collective
deliberation in any but the most important cases. In 2012, the Cour
de cassation rendered an astonishing 11,983 judgments on the mer-
follow a linear sequence of interaction, with participants reflecting more on general
ideas and perspectives in reaching their decisions, while computer-mediated groups
are more task-oriented and structured).
184. Vitaly J. Dubrovsky, Sara Kiesler & Beheruz N. Sethna, The Equalization
Phenomenon: Status Effects in Computer-Mediated and Face-to-Face Decision-Making
Groups, 6 HUM. COMPUTER INTERACTION 119 (1991); Andrea B. Hollingshead, Infor-
mation Suppression and Status Persistence in Group Decision Making: The Effects of
Communication Media, 23 HUM. COMM. RES. 193 (1996); Lee Sproull & Sara Kiesler,
Reducing Social Context Cues: Electronic Mail in Organizational Communication, 32
MGMT. ScI. 1492 (1986).
185. This suggestion derives from Seana Shiffrin's response to a previous version
of this Article presented at the 2014 Comparative Works-in-Progress Workshop held
at UCLA.
186. But it is too soon to draw any definite conclusion here, given that much of the
existing psychological research is still tentative and not specifically tailored to the
court setting. The typical experimental setting, which involves one-time deliberations
by participants who do not know one another on subjects in which they are not ex-
perts, is a far cry from court deliberations comprising legal experts accustomed to
working together. Also, what communication scientists call "online deliberations" are
deliberations exclusively conducted online rather than a mixture of small group meet-
ings and e-mail exchanges. That said, some of the conclusions may nonetheless be
relevant for the court setting.
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its,187 closely followed by the Conseil d'Etat with 9,131,188 the ECtHR
with 1,678,189 and the CJEU with 595 judgments.190 During that
time, by contrast, the Conseil constitutionnel decided 203 cases,191
the U.S. Supreme Court issued 78 opinions,'192 and, for another point
of comparison, the U.K. Supreme Court delivered 43 judgments. 193
To be sure, courts with the greatest caseloads also count more judges.
The Conseil constitutionnel and the U.S. Court both have nine judge-
ships, whereas the Cour de cassation comprises about 163 judges, the
Conseil d'ttat averages 200, the ECtHR has 47, and the CJEU 28.
Despite these size differences, the ratio of cases per judge re-
mains significantly higher at certain courts than at others. Is it
feasible for courts flooded with petitions to fully deliberate each case?
Variations in caseload partly stem from voluntary choices. Certain
courts have devised ways of reducing their caseloads. Others prefer to
keep their dockets intact even if it means that they need to resort to
separate tracks to handle cases. A major divide concerns the process
of screening cases. The basic trade-off is between, on the one hand,
deciding more cases at the cost of resorting to abbreviated forms of
deliberation for a subset of those cases and, on the other hand, decid-
ing fewer cases, but with more deliberative resources available for
each. The U.S. Supreme Court has chosen the latter path, and has
long embraced discretionary jurisdiction. 194 With a few exceptions, it
freely selects the cases it wants to hear. Petitions denied cert are dis-
posed of with minimal judicial deliberations; only those selected by
187. See COUR DE CASSATION, RAPPORT ANNUEL 2012: LA PREUVE DANS LA JURISPRU-
DENCE DE LA COUR DE CASSATION, 514-15 tbls.1-8 & 1-9 (2013), available at http:ll
www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/pdf/rapport-ccassation-2012.pdf. This figure is extrapo-
lated from the Cour de cassation's statistics by subtracting from the civil and criminal
cases terminated in 2012 those which were not decided on the merits, because they
were withdrawn, not admitted (procddure de non-admission), dismissed on procedural
ground, etc.
188. CONSEIL D'TAT, LE CONSEIL D'tTAT ET LA JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE EN 2012 at
9, available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/bilan-activite20l2/data/catalogue.pdf.
189. ECTHR, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 at 152 (2013), available at http://www.echr.coe
.int/Documents/Annual-report_2012_ENG.pdf.
190. Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 23/13, Statistics
Concerning Judicial Activity in 2012: Consolidation of the Results Achieved in Recent
Years (Mar. 6, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013_03/
cp130023en.pdf.
191. Bilan statistique au 30 dcembre 2012, Nouveaux Cahiers du Conseil constitu-
tionnel, no. 39, Apr. 2013, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitution
nel/francais/nouveaux-cahiers-du-conseicahier-n-39/bilan-statistique-au_30_decem
bre-2012.136901.html.
192. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR, tbl.A-1 (2013).
193. THE SUPREME COURT ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2012-2013 at 33 (2013),
available at http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/annual-report-2012-13.pdf (U.K.).
194. Since the Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352,
102 Stat. 662 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257), Supreme Court justices have had almost
absolute control over their workload. See also Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman,
The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81 (1988).
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the Chief Justice or flagged by one of the justices make it to the "dis-
cuss list" during the cert conference. 195 Petitions granted cert,
however, are afforded the full (post-)deliberative treatment described
in Part III.
By contrast, the ex ante courts studied in this Article have re-
tained mandatory jurisdiction. In theory, all properly presented
complaints must be adjudicated. This means that every person filing
a petition is, in principle, entitled to a decision on the merits. In prac-
tice, though, courts under high docket pressure have resorted to
screening cases. For instance, the ECtHR has adopted "filtering"
mechanisms to dismiss applications on a growing number of
grounds.196 In addition, a three-judge committee, rather than the
standard seven-judge section, now decides so-called "repetitive"
cases. 197 They are expedited with minimal discussion between the
registry lawyer, the reporting judge, and the two other judges, who
basically rubber-stamp the proposal. As an ECtHR judge commented,
"at the committee level, things move very fast. This is what increased
the Court's output."' 9 8 Other courts such as the Conseil d'Etat or the
Cour de cassation have embraced similar case management schemes
to weed out "easy" cases for fast-track resolution by either judges sit-
ting alone or three-judge panels. 199 A Conseil d'Etat judge thus
recount: "[Wihen I arrived here, any minuscule Conseil d'Etat deci-
sion was made by a judicial panel comprising nine people. Nowadays
half of our decisions are made by judges sitting alone. '200 Only cases
considered as "hard" or "important" are resolved through a process
195. Minimal judicial deliberation does not mean minimal judicial attention,
though. As mentioned at supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text, each petition is
addressed by at least one "pool memo" (or sometimes more than one, if a justice does
not participate in the "cert pool" and requires that his clerks individually review all
petitions), which is circulated among the chambers and marked up. See PERRY, supra
note 116, at 51-58.
196. Since 2010, ECtHR judges sitting alone have had the authority to declare an
application inadmissible, which sometimes involves an examination of the merits of
the case. See Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention art 7,
Council of Europe, opened for signature May 13, 2004, C.E.T.S. No. 194 (entered into
force June 1, 2010).
197. The ECtHR defines an application as repetitive if it pertains to "issues which
have already been the subject of Court decisions and therefore should have been re-
solved by the respondent member States." See ECTHR, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra
note 189, at 47 (speech given by Thomas Hammarberg).
198. Interview with Judge 0., judge at the ECtHR since 2008 (July 8, 2014) (my
translation).
199. This case management system, called the procddure d'admission des pourvois
en cassation (PAPC), has been in use since 1987. See Loi 87-1127 du 31 d~cembre
1987 portant r6forme du contentieux administratif [Law 87-1127 of Dec. 31, 1987 Re-
forming Administrative Law] art. 11, J.0., Jan. 1, 1988, pp. 7, 8.
200. Interview with Judge I., conseiller d'Etat at the Conseil d'Etat (June 30, 2010)
(my translation).
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involving the full range of small group pre-deliberations described
earlier.
Through various methods, therefore, courts confronted with a
high volume of cases adapt their practices to avoid overflow. Deliber-
ation has become an expensive use of time, a scarce resource. Courts
ration it, reserving it for the few cases viewed as deserving of the
court's full array of mutually justificatory activities. A seasoned Con-
seil d'Etat judge summarized this approach using a clothing industry
metaphor. In her words, every application admitted is directed to-
ward one of three judicial panels: three-judge panels, which, as she
put it, specialize in "ready-to-wear garment," nine-judge sections for
"tailor-made work," and eighteen-judge sections or the full court for
"haute couture."20 1
The growing dockets of courts of last resort play a decisive role in
the structuring of their internal organizational cultures. There is an
inevitable tension between courts' aspirations to make decisions
based on deliberation and their need to dispose of their caseload in a
timely manner. As a result, if high-caseload courts do deliberate, they
tend to do so selectively or through expedited procedures. Thus, only
a subset of their caseload is decided through fully deliberative
procedures.
B. Opinions
So far, I have focused on high courts' inner workings rather than
on their outputs, i.e., judicial opinions. What is the relationship, if
any, between a court's internal organization and its opinions? This
Article rejects "deductive institutionalism," i.e., the idea that rea-
soned opinions necessarily reflect reasoned deliberations. 202 Instead,
I am inclined to think that there is a reciprocal influence between a
court's institutional design and the style of its opinions. My hypothe-
sis is that the style and form of judicial opinions condition a court's
work methods as much as those methods inform opinion-writing.
Further research should be done to elaborate this hypothesis, but for
now I will briefly outline and illustrate it.
Typical ex ante opinions follow the single judgment approach:
the court issues a single authoritative judgment, speaking with one
voice. Opinions are not signed by their individual author, the report-
ing judge. They must meet a host of formal requirements both in
terms of presentation and reasoning, following a constraining format
consisting of separate parts covering the issues, facts, law, law appli-
cation, and the disposition of the case. 203 Following the Continental
201. Author's ethnographic field notes (May 18, 2012) (on file with author).
202. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 30, at 45.
203. For instance, the structure of ECtHR judgments is mandated by the Court's
Rules. See ECTHR RULES OF COURT, supra note 91, Rule 74.
1002 [Vol. 62
EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST DELIBERATIONS
tradition, judges tend to use hypertechnical language and repetitive
expressions, making it difficult for the general public to understand
what is being said.204 More importantly for our purposes, individual
votes are usually not disclosed, even though the judges may have
been deeply split on a particular issue. The opinion makes little or no
pretense to tracking the judges' actual internal decision-making pro-
cess. The judges present a seemingly united front, which is in fact
made up of distinct and individual contributions. If there have been
any disagreements among judges, they are hardly visible in the pub-
lic arena. The ECtHR allows separate opinions, but the majority
opinion is considered the judgment of the court. Tellingly, dissenting
or concurring judges are merely permitted to "annex" 20 5 their sepa-
rate opinions to the court's judgment. 20 6 Separate opinions do not add
to the judgment as in the U.K. or U.S. Supreme Courts, where the
court's ratio sometimes needs to be extracted from several
opinions. 207
U.S. Supreme Court opinions exhibit different qualities. In spite
of considerable variations, they are discursive, open-textured, and
longer compared to ex ante judgments. Justices claim authorship and
responsibility for their portion of the writing. The style of individual
justices is idiosyncratic in a way that is unparalleled in ex ante
courts, where judgments adhere to a template and are sometimes
specifically reviewed for stylistic consistency. 20 The justices enjoy
great expressive and rhetorical freedom, occasionally resorting to fig-
urative or humorous language to explain their reasoning. Opinions
204. For instance, the French and European courts introduce successive
paragraphs with the phrases "Considgrant" ["Considering"] or "Attendu que" ["Given
that"]. See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004) (describing the French
judicial style, in particular that of the Cour de cassation).
205. See ECTHR RULES OF COURT, supra note 91, Rule 74(2) ("Any judge who has
taken part in the consideration of the case by a Chamber or by the Grand Chamber
shall be entitled to annex to the judgment either a separate opinion, concurring with
or dissenting from that judgment, or a bare statement of dissent.")
206. See Robin C.A. White, Judgments in the Strasbourg Court: Some Reflections
4-5 (working paper, SSRN-id 1435197), available at http:/fssrn.com/abstract=14351
97 (arguing that the presentation of ECtHR judgments fundamentally differs from
common law judgments, where each opinion stands on its own and readers are re-
sponsible for figuring out what the court's decision is).
207. See Pamela C. Corley et al., Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Deci-
sions on the United States Supreme Court, 31 JUST. SYs. J. 180 (2010) (analyzing the
causes of the U.S. Supreme Court's plurality decisions where the Court is unable to
generate a single opinion that is supported by a majority of the justices.)
208. The CJEU thus has a team of lecteurs d'arr~t (judgment readers), who are
often French or Belgian national judges in charge of editing and polishing the court's
judgments, erasing any stylistic deviation. The ECtHR recently created a similar unit
for its most important opinions, but like the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de cassation,
it owes much of its stylistic unity to its staffs acculturation with the prevailing norms
rather than enforcement by a policing unit. ECtHR Registry lawyers, much like the
Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de cassation's junior judges, are trained in the court's
opinion-writing style upon their arrival at the court.
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reveal, to some extent, the court's internal decision-making process.
The court's public discourse is often visibly split, especially in cases
with high ideological stakes, such as those involving questions of
rights and liberties. This is not to say that ex post opinions are candid
and fully mirror judges' discussions and background negotiations. 20 9
By and large, ex post justices openly acknowledge their disagree-
ments, but refrain from divulging the compromises and quid pro quo
that took place behind closed doors.
In sum, ex ante and ex post courts present us not only with diver-
gent ways of making decisions, but also with different schemes for
justifying them. The style of opinions may have affected the courts'
internal organization as much as their internal organization may
have shaped their style of opinions. We can imagine several possible
channels of reciprocal influence between high courts' opinions and
their modes of deliberation.
1. When the Style of Opinions Affects a Court's Internal
Culture
Ex ante courts. The required facade of unanimity in ex ante cul-
tures may increase the sense of collaboration among judges. More
specifically, as we have seen, the need to issue a unanimous (or seem-
ingly unanimous) opinion causes judges to pre-deliberate before the
conference. When judges know that they will be called upon to sign a
common opinion by the end of the conference meeting, they probably
feel a strong incentive to begin discussions ahead of time. If they
failed to do so, they would run the risk of partially surrendering their
decision-making authority to the reporting judge. As a senior judge at
the Conseil d'Etat stressed, "[t]he wording of the opinion must be ap-
proved by the judicial panel in its entirety .... [T]he draft is read
collectively and approved collectively."210 There is no time for in-
depth discussion, negotiation, and rewriting at the conference table.
Judges eager to see their viewpoints taken into account need to per-
suade their colleagues beforehand.
Ex post courts. We can conjecture that when judges are individu-
ally responsible for explanations, they are disinclined to pre-
deliberate. There is little impetus for U.S. justices to pre-agree or ne-
gotiate before the conference; the writing judge has not yet been
picked, so there is not much to consult about. As we saw, in an ex
ante court, the most promising means for a dissenting judge to make
his voice heard is to influence the wording of the court's opinion. By
contrast, in an ex post court, a justice does not need to transact with
209. I have argued elsewhere, however, that judges cannot and should not be held
to a requirement of candor. See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason Giving: When
May Legal Decision-Makers Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091 (2010).
210. Interview with Judge I., supra note 200 (my translation).
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her colleagues: she can always voice her disagreement by writing sep-
arately. But there might be multiple incentives to collaborate with
others and engage in persuasion efforts after the conference meeting.
For example, a writing justice might want to engage in post-delibera-
tions when the majority coalition is fragile or when she is hoping to
garner wider support for her theory. Justices change some of their
votes, they ask clerks to find out more about why their colleagues on
the bench have balked or what the significance of another justice's
argument is, and through this process, the language in opinions is
refined.
2. When a Court's Internal Culture Affects Opinion-Writing
Ex ante courts. The effect of pre-deliberating as a group can be
the production of a line of reasoning that is hard to follow. The report-
ing judge alone is initially responsible for the handling of the case.
But as discussed above, other decision-makers become involved early
in the process. Those can be, depending on the court, a check judge,
the Advocate General, the jurisconsult, staff lawyers, clerks, and
translators. This first round of feedback often causes the reporting
judge to revise her draft. A second round of editing follows. Once the
draft opinion has circulated among the full panel and a majority has
emerged, multiple participants are encouraged to make their views
known. Members of the minority influence the wording of the opinion
as much as members of the majority, sometimes even more So.2 1 1 Ul-
timately, no one individual judge bears sole responsibility for the
draft, which goes through many hands and may integrate multiple
and sometimes conflicting points of view. This effort to reach a con-
sensual solution and to include as much feedback as possible in the
reasoning is often reflected in confused and obscure opinions.
212
Ex post courts. Justices' custom of post-deliberating naturally
has repercussions on opinions. Ex post judicial cultures shy away
from a norm of consensus, a feature that manifests itself in split deci-
sions. It may be that U.S. Supreme Court opinions have become
highly divided in the past decades partly because the conference dis-
cussion has atrophied. In the U.K., "the prevailing ethos on these
matters in the House of Lords [forerunner to the Supreme Court] is
that of laissez-faire. By and large, it is up to the individual Law Lord
whether he writes or not, and whether he dissents or not."2 13 As
211. See Edward, supra note 40, at 556 (noting in regards to the CJEU that "[tihe
minority are not excluded from the deliberations of the majority, nor do they have any
interest in excluding themselves since they may yet be able to swing the majority
towards their point of view or at least attenuate what they find objectionable").
212. See e.g., Andr6 Tunc, La Cour de cassation en crise, 30 ARCHIVES DE
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 157, 165 (1985) (observing that collegiality imposes judicial
compromises which are "less clear" and a "source of ambiguity").
213. PATERSON (1982), supra note 144, at 108.
2014] 1005
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
noted above, there is little collective face-to-face deliberation that
could lead to the possibility of the sorts of concessions and accommo-
dations required for the Court to speak with a more unified voice.
When they do occur, these concessions and accommodations tend to
be mediated and to take place after the conference. The current Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Roberts, seems to think
that the Court's conferencing style has an impact on opinions. A few
years ago, he declared that he would strive as Chief Justice to instill
a more collegial culture at the Court in order to produce less frag-
mented opinions.214
The precise nature of the interaction between institutional de-
sign and the style of opinion remains an area for further exploration.
In particular, it would be useful to clarify the relevant factors-be
they pre- or post-deliberations, the need for unanimity, or the en-
trenched style of judgments.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed two models for thinking about the way
in which high courts structure their collective reasoning. I have ar-
gued that the internal organizational culture of courts of last resort
may present institutional obstacles to deliberation in the sense cham-
pioned by deliberative democrats. That is not to say that courts of
last resort do not deliberate. Ex ante courts pre-deliberate, while ex
post courts post-deliberate. In both cultures, important judgments
are the result of multiple decision-making stages in the form of suc-
cessive mini-deliberations through small group, interpersonal
communications. That the components of deliberation happen in
small groups does not make the deliberation any less of a mutually
justificatory activity if we understand the democratic ideal to be one
of mutual justification, an acknowledged obligation to be responsive
to other parties' reasons, and a greater manifest openness to being
influenced by the arguments of others.
However, the democratic model of deliberation fails to account
for some of the specific constraints faced by high courts, such as the
involvement of participants of different statuses in the decision-mak-
ing process, the production of legal knowledge based on expertise that
is not equally shared by all, and the need to balance caseloads
against deliberative expectations. That said, courts' internal organi-
zational cultures have established expectations of elaborated and
articulated mutual justification and created opportunities for and an
openness to persuasion, negotiation, and compromise. Even when the
conversations and exchanges that compose the mutually justificatory
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activity are reduced or expedited, or involve unequally situated par-
ticipants, the organizational cultures guarantee if not quality
decision-making, then at least consideration of multiple viewpoints.
In this sense, I second deliberative democrats' argument that
processes matter. High court judges are not any less inclined to hide
their own biases, ideological preferences, and interests behind a
screen of principle and legalese than anyone else, but their decision-
making procedures are formalized in a way that may help eliminate
some of these subjective factors-namely, through pre- and post-
deliberations.
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